ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY: By Taras Kuzio
Ukrayinska Pravda in Ukrainian and Russian
Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, March 6, 2006
The Action Ukraine Report - 669, Article 10
Washington, D.C., Tuesday, March 7, 2006

Ukrainian ministers continue to publicly remain optimistic about their country's chances of NATO membership. Different dates are given for the country's entry, from 2008-2010.

Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandohiy said Ukraine hoped to be included in those countries invited to join at the 2008 NATO summit, which is expected to be an enlargement summit. Three other countries could be included in this enlargement wave, Croatia, Albania and Macedonia.

Included in the 2008 enlargement wave would likely see Ukraine, and the other three countries, join NATO in 2010. This would be good timing for Ukraine as it would follow the October 2009 presidential elections. But, it would assume that the NATO friendly Viktor Yushchenko would be re-elected for a second term or, failing that, his replacement was pro-NATO.

NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer supports the view that the 2008 NATO summit  would be an enlargement summit that would invite in western Balkan states and Ukraine. He refused to give a concrete follow up date when these four countries would actually become NATO members.

Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko sees the likelihood of Ukraine obtaining a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the NATO summit in Riga in November, the first to be held in a former Soviet country. This would give Ukraine the opportunity to complete two annual cycles of MAP before being invited to join NATO.

The unilateralist Bush administration is also committed to supporting democratization abroad, including Ukraine and Georgia, which includes giving these countries the protection of NATO. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is on record as supporting Ukraine's NATO membership.

An influential Ukrainian newspaper concluded that, 'The US will support it in every possible way and call on the other allies to help Ukraine integrate into the alliance'.

Unilateralism could work in Ukraine's favor as it reduces the need for the US to take into account Russian objections to NATO membership for Ukraine. This is especially, at a time when democratic regression is taking place in Russia.

The 2003 territorial conflict with Russia over the Tuzla island near the Crimea, the 2005-2006 gas crisis and on-going dispute over Black Sea Fleet illegal use of Crimean lighthouses have reinforced the need in the minds of a large portion of Ukraine's elites for the country to achieve NATO membership.

President Yushchenko told a joint meeting of the National Security and Defense Council and NATO's  North Atlantic Council in Kyiv that NATO membership would provide the necessary external guarantees for Ukraine's national security.

NATO membership, de Hoop Scheffer added, may be also seen as a stepping stone to EU membership. The EU is inclined is currently only offering "Enhanced Partnership" to Ukraine rather than full membership. As the "carrot" of EU membership was crucial in encouraging post-communist states to undertake painful and unpopular reforms, the absence of such a "carrot" may negatively influence reforms inside Ukraine.

PROBLEMS ON UKRAINE'S ROAD TO NATO
Although Ukraine has a high chance of being invited into the MAP process in 2006 the time frame for achieving full membership could be delayed beyond the 2008 NATO summit because of the widely held view inside European members of NATO that Ukraine is not 'ready'. The three western Balkan states are already in the MAP process.

President Yushchenko is correct to state that no country invited into NATO's Intensified Dialogue on Membership, which Ukraine was invited to join in May 2005, has never not ultimately joined NATO. But, the short timeframe of 2006-2008 for a MAP before being invited into NATO may mean Ukraine's invitation may be postponed after 2008.

The Ukrainian authorities is too optimistic about Ukraine's chances of entering NATO - even though there are the best international conditions for this step. It is not just a question of free and fair elections, a Western demand that is likely to be met by Ukraine.

A British Foreign office official working on Ukraine told me recently that such a free election would be one of the first in the CIS since the early 1990s (and certainly in Ukraine since 1994). Another condition is that Yushchenko attempt to have good relations with Russia. In the West, Yushchenko is not seen as anti-Russian.

But, a third Western expectation is to wait and see whether reformers dominate the Parliament coalition and government? It is in this expectation that there are two contradictions facing the authorities that will be decided by the 2006 election results.

FIRST, many Western members of NATO  will condition supporting Ukraine being invited into a MAP at the Riga summit based on if there is a re-unified Orange  Parliament coalition.

A re-unified Orange Parliament coalition will send a SIGNAL to NATO and the EU that Ukraine's democratic breakthrough begun by the Orange Revolution and election of Yushchenko as Ukraine's first reformist President  is now consolidated and the reform process is sustainable. The paradox of this expectation is that one of the three branches of the Orange coalition - the Socialists - are hostile to NATO membership.

SECOND, as an alternative to a re-unified Orange coalition, Anders Aslund is lobbying in Washington for an Our Ukraine-Regions coalition. After his January visit to Ukraine he wrote that such a Parliament coalition is what Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, State Secretary Oleh Rybachuk and  National Security and Defense Council Anatoliy Kinakh also allegedly support.

If this is indeed true, do Aslund and these three members of the Orange vlada realize what SIGNAL such a coalition would send to NATO and the EU. And,  how support for such a coalition would undermine the goal of Ukraine's membership in NATO?

A Our Ukraine-Regions of Ukraine coalition would give a SIGNAL that Ukraine is backtracking on reform and regressing away from the Orange Revolution. NATO would postpone inviting Ukraine into a MAP and Ukraine would miss being invited to join in the third round of NATO enlargement in 2008.

An additional consequence of supporting a Parliament coalition with Regions of Ukraine would be to make Yushchenko a virtual President (which constitutional changes would simply reinforce). Yushchenko's support in western-central Ukraine would collapse and his supporters would defect to Tymoshenko.

Eastern-southern Ukrainians would not give Yushchenko credit for doing a deal with their Regions party. This would lead to Yushchenko not being re-elected for a second term in 2009.

Does Our Ukraine not remember the drop in its support after it signed a strategically futile memorandum with Regions of Ukraine in late September 2005, a memorandum that Yushchenko himself discarded in January?

Would an Orange coalition support Ukraine's membership of NATO? Not completely.

Throughout the CIS, the left are hostile to NATO membership. This makes the post-Soviet left very different to the left in the Baltic states and Central Europe. Remember post-communist Polish President Aleksandr Kwasniewski's ardent backing for Polish membership of NATO. We could not imagine any Ukrainian left-wing leader, pro-Orange or anti-Orange, following in Kwasniewski's footsteps.

Ultimately, the major hurdle to be overcome in Ukraine will be the attitude of the Party of Regions, which is set to have the largest faction in the newly elected parliament. The Party of Regions is dominant in eastern Ukraine where opposition to NATO membership is highest.

Without the conversion of the Party of Regions after March 2006 into a pro-NATO force, or at least neutrally disposed towards membership, it is difficult to see how Ukraine can move beyond a MAP into membership by 2008-2010 as President Yushchenko and Ukrainian officials constantly reiterate.

THREE DEMANDS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
NATO and the Bush administration expect three objectives to be met in Ukraine for membership to become a potential future option.

FIRST, the holding of free and fair elections on 26 March as understood by the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This objective is very likely to be met as Ukraine holds its first free elections since 1994.

SECOND, continued political, economic and defense reforms. Although the pace of reforms since Yushchenko's elections have been slower than expected, and often contradictory, that there is forward momentum is internationally recognized.

Freedom House upgraded Ukraine to 'free' this year, the country was granted market economic status by the EU and USA and the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) on money laundering has halted its monitoring of Ukraine

There is an on going cleaning up, and reform of, the Interior Ministry and military under Interior Minister (MVS) Yuriy Lutsenko, on a high profile visit to Washington DC last week, and Defense Minister Hrytsenko. Hrytsenko has called for greater coordination among Ukraine's security forces where duties often overlap.

NATO is set to assist in this endeavor by expanding  its long standing cooperation with the military to the Security Service, MVS, Border Troops and Ministry for Emergency Situations.

THIRD, the most contentious issue is that of regional opposition to NATO membership and low public support. Some other post-communist states, such as Slovenia and Hungary, also had low public support for membership. The populist Tymoshenko bloc have reiterated their opposition to joining NATO if there is not public support within Ukraine.

Ukraine is different from earlier countries which have joined NATO in that it would be the first truly post-Soviet state to be invited to join NATO, as the three Baltic states were always treated differently and never joined the CIS. Only 10% of Ukrainians understand what NATO is and why the country should join, a legacy of Soviet anti-NATO propaganda.

There was also a lack of an information campaign on NATO during the Leonid Kuchma era. This lack of a positive campaign on the merits of membership has left a vacuum into which the former Kuchma camp has launched an anti-NATO membership campaign.

LACK OF AN ALL-ROUND STRATEGY
The anti-NATO campaign is being led by the Ne Tak! (Not This Way!) election bloc grouped around the Social Democratic united Party headed by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration in Kuchma's last years in power. An important financial source for 'Ne Tak!' bloc and anti-NATO campaign is the Republican Party led by former Naftohaz Ukrainy CEO Yuriy Boyko.

Boyko was set to be arrested in summer 2005 but this was halted after presidential adviser and energy tycoon Oleksandr Tretyakov intervened. Boyko is thought to be a major recipient of income from the shady Rosukrenergo created in July 2004 and included in the January new gas contract with Russia.

This shows how the failure to launch criminal proceedings against past corruption in the energy sector, and continuing to work with the shadowy Rosukrenergo, undermines other policies. Namely, the strategic aim to seek NATO membership. Not surprisingly, Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk are against the gas agreement.

SECOND, support for a coalition with Regions of Ukraine (which Yekhanurov, Rybachuk and Kinakh allegedly support) shows the degree to which the Ukrainian government is itself not united over its NATO strategy. Is their dislike of Tymoshenko more important than their support for Ukraine's NATO membership, which would be postponed if such a Rada coalition was formed?

THIRD, the largest faction in the new Rada will be Regions of Ukraine. It will include numerous senior level Kuchma officials against whom no criminal charges have been laid. Bandits to Prison have been replaced by Bandits to Parliament!

How do Ukraine's foreign policy strategists expect to deal with the question that the largest faction in the new Rada is against NATO membership? How do those government officials who prefer an Our Ukraine-Regions coalition not understand that this would send a signal to NATO that Our Ukraine is cooperating with an anti-NATO political force.

If President Yushchenko had fulfilled his campaign promise to send Bandits to Prison, Regions of Ukraine would not have the largest faction in the new Rada. Regions would not have been able to take revenge for what it sees as a stolen victory in 2004. And, the largest faction in Ukraine's parliament would have been pro-NATO (Our Ukraine), not anti-NATO (Regions).

CONCLUSION
Holding a free election and not proposing anti-Russian policies are two Western expectations of President Yushchenko that he will fulfill easily. He is a democrat and is not anti-Russian. A third more difficult expectation is that an Orange coalition be established in the Rada after the elections.

Ukraine has two coalition possibilities in the new Rada. In choosing which coalition to go into, President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine will, in turn, influence Ukraine's successful drive to NATO or postpone it indefinitely.

1. A re-united Orange coalition leading to an invitation to join MAP at the Riga NATO summit in October. This would be followed by an invitation to join NATO (together with Albania, Croatia, Macedonia) at its 2008 summit.

2. An Our Ukraine-Regions coalition that will lead to a postponement of NATO's decision on inviting Ukraine into MAP. Such a postponement would lead to Ukraine not being included in the third wave of NATO enlargement in 2008.