Entries from July 1, 2007 - August 1, 2007
Foreign and Domestic Affairs
A roundup of some non-political news during this campaign period
This being campaign time, there's lots of politics to talk about, but some other news as well.
The Kremlin rejects a challenge and accepts a challenge
In international news, it seems that Yulia Tymoshenko's cheerful bit of gauntlet-throwing in Foreign Affairs a little while back won't be getting a response from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the after all. Originally Lavrov was going to submit the Russian government's own Foriegn Affairs article, but when the issue was practically on its way to the printers, he suddenly retracted his submission.
The justification provided for this was a set of vague claims of "bias" and massive bowdlerizing of the article. The fact that it had already been run by him and approved for a second time prior to this outburst and the direct disagreement was over a subheading casts his claims in rather a suspicious light. In any case, the Russian Foreign Ministry went ahead and put up substantially the same piece on the Russian MoFA website. Read it here to try and see what the fuss was about.
In more direct foreign diplomacy, the Ukrainian government issued a different kind of challenge to its Russian counterpart. In an effort to improve relations, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry lifted the travel bans on the Russian politicians who agitated with the Crimean separatists and NATO-opposers a few years ago. Part of the gentlemen's agreement with Putin was that the Russian government would, in turn, lift the ban on politicians like Poroshenko who were being blocked due to... due to... well, pique, apparently, since they were never accused of any agitation moderately resembling that of Zatulin and Zhirinovsky. Instead they were accused of being from a government that had banned Russians. In any case, the Russian government has responded. And who knows what dastardly deeds Poroshenko might do. Bwahaha.
Sulfur spill
Outside of politics, the biggest trauma in Ukraine recently has been that a train-load of phosphorus being transported through Ukraine from Kazakhstan either derailed and caught fire or caught fire and derailed last week. Dozens died, according to the BBC and the number of hospitalized rose to about 140-150. Of course NUNS has not only been criticizing Ukrainian Railway, Ukrzaliznytsya, but also accusing the PoR Transportation Ministry for its "slow reaction" to the disaster. One might argue that being the first to lob off accusations is hardly a helpful response. On the other hand, the ministry's quick flip-flop from Minister Kuzmuk's initial response in which he made reference to Chornobyl and said, "we are again dealing with a case that can pose a real threat for the Ukrainian people", to shortly afterwards giving an all clear sign was rather disquieting.
And the economic news wrap-up
Retail turnover rates are soaring. And more repetition of the good news in SigmaBleyzer's quite detailed report for June. Foreign banks are also investing heavily in Ukraine, which should also help stabilize that market more, provided the parent banks have spread their assets sufficiently and increase the overall market stability. Judging by the current interest rates at Ukrainian banks, this is a pretty strong probability.
Even moreso, not only have Ukrainians been making money in past weeks week, they'd also been pulling it out of the ground in Crimea.
This being an election year, I wonder which politician is going to claim credit for this Crimean treasure chest.
Left Out
the kid nobody wants on his team
After a few opening forays last month (a couple promises to voters snuck into other speeches as politicians tried to sneak past campaign laws here and there), the pitches are flying. Here's a helpful roundup of political slogans of the month, from ForUm. What do you all say: in this group of pitches, which are the foul balls, and which are the strikes?
And among the former orange parties, the repositioning continues. Current poll ratings indicate that the joint group of Yushchenko's Nasha Ukrayina (NU) and Lutsenko and Kyrylenko's National Self-Defense (NS) in a single bloc (NUNS) has already draw quite close to the ratings of Tymoshenko's BYuT. (Must... control urge to make "Nuns on the Run" jokes, must... control urge...). There is even some discussion of a BYuT and NUNS uniting for another election.
One development that may help NU reunite with BYuT is that it continues to sideline some of the opposing friends in its own ranks. The most recent two have been Yekhanurov and Bezsmirtniy. I've never thought much of Bezsmirtniy as a politician. so seeing him go seems like a good move to me. Yekhanurov, I'll admit I liked back when he became PM. I would have preferred no break with BYuT to having him, but he talked some economic sense and I was amazed at how much Zerkalo Nedeli seemed to like him.
He's always been part of the "rapprochement with Yanukovych before Tymoshenko" wing of NU, though, so in the interest of seeing Ukrainian voters get some options in the election, it's probably best that he's getting shunted back to the minor leagues off in Dnipropetrovsk.
Yushchenko maintaining his Kuchma-era stance, and abandoning it
However, in a way very similar to his past behavior Yushchenko is again trying court oligarchs at the same time as he's uniting with anti-oligarch parties. Here he is taking an active hand in ousting his own PoR-friendly deputies because they're losing voters for him, as well as trying to rescue NU by bringing it together with more confrontational anti-oligarch parties, but at the same time trying to appeal to oligarchs? I really don't get what his angle is, and it can't help his relations with either NS or BYuT to be chumming with their avowed opponents, let alone voters.
More troubling still than his reverting to past form is a contradiction pointed out by Zerkalo Nedeli: Yushchenko is also agitating for reforms to the Constitution that would increase presidential power, move the country towards authoritarianism, and create "a coffin for Ukrainian democracy". The quote isn't mine, and it isn't ZN's, either. It's Yushchenko 2000's quote, when Kuchma proposed exactly the same raft of reforms. Now would be a good time for him to cut the hypocrisy and work with what he's got.
The all center-rightist candidate list
One group of people that no one is making overtures to now, though, is the Socialists. I've mentioned this fact in the last couple entries, but wanted to at least pause in this one to contemplate this important point. With the Socialists on their way out, by all poll numbers, and the Communists reduced to perhaps 5-6% of the Rada at most, Ukrainians electoral choices seem to include no significant leftist groups.
First take a look at the other parties to see where they're located. BYuT, like it's founder has ever been more populist than leftist; much more likely to dance around the middle where they might win points with voters on both sides than run out and stake an reduced-free-market stance. NS is pretty much a one-note party, with the note being "fight corruption". In any case, Lutsenko wasn't sufficiently devoted to left-leaning policies to give up a chance to join in a block with NU. NU has always had its allies in big business, and even if they're being sidelined now, Yushchenko seems determined to make new ones. That leaves, PoR, which has more big business ties than any other party in the Rada, and thus has even less incentive than they do to take a leftist stand that would damage those ties.
All of which means that Ukrainians can choose from different personalities this September, but not substantially different ideologies. What an amazingly narrow breadth of choice! Their ballot slips are going to look almost like Soviet-era store shelves: only a few things to choose from, and not much to differentiate any them.
This being a speculation about a non-phenomenon (the lack of left) I really don't have any links or events to hang this section on. But I would certainly love opinions and speculation on the potential effects of this imbalance.
Ideas?
Preparing for the Elections
bring on the populist rhetoric
Despite weak attempts by Moroz and the Socialists to forestall it, things are moving forward towards a September 30 voting day. Moroz's force will disappear after the election, so the action seems understandable. However, every other political force is unlikely to change much in its standing and is thus satisfied with holding them. Moroz is reaping what he sowed in summer of 2006 by joining with PoR, so despite his sad position now, he is unlikely to be missed in October.
Another shift that has happened is that it appears Lutsenko and Kyrylenko have gone with the safe bet. Just recently, their People's Self Defense Party signed to join in an election bloc with Our Ukraine. Taras Kuzio, writing in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, breaks down the benefits to Our Ukraine of the alliance. Missing from the discussion is the benefit to PSD. Essentially, what is probably happening is that the party is currently at 3.3% popularity. That leaves it dangerously close to the 3% bar required for a party to get into Parliament on its own. Joining with OU is the safe bet because it will mean that PSD will not have to worry about that bar, because it's numbers will be calculated as part of the overall pool with OU. A bit disappointing not to see them venture out on their own, since PSD looked cleaner than OU, but PSD deputies will largely be free to go their own way after September.
Aside from the disappearance of the Socialists and the reapportionment among the former orange parties, not much is likely to change on September 30. Polling results for President (in an "if presidential elections were held tomorrow interview) and parliament show roughly the same divide as currently.
Which means yet more years for the Communists to continue to fill our lives with mirth.
Talk Talking
Yushchenko is about helping students, removing parliamentary deputy immunity, and giving money to lots of people: must be election time again. It seems that the primary item on that list to Yanukovych, though is the part about taking away deputy immunity. He accuses Yushchenko of words instead of deeds and thus being a populist (and, not to be outdone, his party also called on the President to sign their law to increase wages).
Furthermore, Yanukovych faults Yushchenko for populism: making promises that won't be backed up by actions. Except that the deputies' immunity from prosecution, and therefore relatively freedom from accountability, is not something Yushchenko could push through Parliament is that PoR's deeds, not its words (along with big businesspeople in every party that's got them, including Our Ukraine) would be to crush such a vote. The reason this particular rhetoric makes him angry, therefore, is that he and his party don't want to even mention the possibility.
The tight runoff in the competition for most watery promises
Since Yanukovych brought up the term, we might take a look at Ukrainian parties to determine who are the biggest populists. Taras Kuzio has done so in a Kyiv Post article, and argued convincingly that in combining a hazy ideological standpoint and isolationist tendencies while complaining about things that matter to people (but not actually doing anything about them) PoR can claim the title of most populist party in the nation (remember when PoR was championing the Russian language (non-)issue, Crimean separatism, or devolution of power to the regions?).
Yushchenko has also been doing some good work as well as talking the talk. One effort I noticed was his decidedly un-populist batting down of limits on foreign imports. Nice one.
Yanukovych's recent moves have included invoking the I know nothing defense about where PoR gets its financing. Good move. The defense can never hold up under even the slightest scrutiny, of course, but it moves the discussion on to other matters and the less time anyone looks at PoR financing, the better off he will be. His other recent move has been to call on all parties to sign a new mutual non-aggression pact before the September election. Not quite sure what he's angling at with that. Possibly to try and get Yushchenko to simply stand next to him and agree on something, considering how much that tanked Our Ukraine's ratings back in 2005. Or perhaps trying to steal a beat on Yushchenko and Tymoshenko by saying he opposes election fraud before they do. In any case, Yushchenko's retort was been to order central and regional governments (greatly influenced by PoR) to provide those same fair election conditions.
As for Tymoshenko, whom I myself have called a populist, she's again showing up Yushchenko and Yanukovych with her rhetoric. Specifically, I would recommend this sermon from the pulpit of Zerkalo Nedeli. What's most well-done is that, while supremely optimistic, she makes not one specific populist statment in the whole speech.
Other moves of hers include an attempt to steer voters away from newly minted parties and a call on Yushchenko to stop PoR from privatizing state assets in ways that don't help the nation. In drawing attention to privatization record of the Yanukovych government, though, she is only repeating accusations made by Yushchenko's secretary Viktor Boloha. With quite a bit of luck, there might even be a government in power by October with an inclination to do something about this.
Good News
I like to end entries on a happy note around here, so economic news comes last. According to the WTO Ukrainian poverty has gone from 32% in 2001, to 14% in 2004, to 8% today. As the Economist mentions in this excellent survey of the current Ukrainian situation (recommended reading!) "one reason the economy is doing well, say some, is that politicians are too busy fighting each other to meddle".
