BYuT and NUNS fight over city politics, the nation gets closer to crisis

February and part of March were the Party of Region's chance to waste everyone's time blocking parliament with their NATO Circus of Obstructionism. The end of March seems to have been burnt up looking for the next issue for politicians to focus on. Now it's April and they've finally found something to keep themselves from addressing any of the multiple looming disasters—the Kyiv Mayoral Election.

NUNS is the less popular party, but is pushing for the vastly more popular candidate in this election: Klitchko. BYuT's candidate is Turchynov, who has about 6% popularity to Klitchko's 31%. That means that if Tymoshenko wants him to win she'll have to spend massive amounts of time and political capital to do so. So far she doesn't seem to have been deterred at seeing what PoR earned for its anti-NATO efforts on a national level—a ten percent drop in popularity and repeated local election losses to Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko.

Certainly Baloha and his new gang (a breakaway from NUNS) haven't acted constructively and won't do so in the future. But NUNS bleeds votes every election because of their pettiness and unprofessionalism. It's BYuT, which is stronger and more politically savvy that will need to compromise here, because there are much bigger national problems her Cabinet needs to be addressing.

Inflation

Thank's to IIU's blogging, readers here already know that inflation is a big problem that's getting worse. Years without reform, worldwide price increases for foodstuffs, government-on-government increases in unsupported payouts to voters (the most recent being Tymoshenko's payments on Soviet accounts) have all resulted in 26% inflation this March.

As with other issues, NUNS and BYuT are working at cross-purposes. Tymoshenko's payouts went through, but the privatizations she proposed to use to generate the money to pay for them were vetoed by Yushchenko. She's tried to get rid of a longstanding land auction ban which she also thinks could improve economic growth (I do, too) and has again been vetoed by Yushchenko. I would be less apt to think Yushchenko was simply playing spoiler if I saw any indication that he has a better plan instead of his usual vague generalities.

Tymoshenko has said the government going to stop inflation in five to six months. To do this will take actual reforms, though, and that means working with NUNS. That may not be possible under any circumstances, but fighting over the Kyiv mayor is the one way to ensure defeat.

Gas Price Hikes

RosUkrEnergo is still hanging on in Ukraine-Russia gas deals despite Tymoshenko's opposition. She is claiming a victory anyway by saying that the deals will happen on Russian soil so it is technically "out of the Ukrainian market", but it looks from this angle like she's trying to save face after failing to eliminate it.

Though Russia has been able to keep its intermediary (and its active push to keep RosUkrEnergo throughout the negotiations last month confirms that it is, indeed, Russia's preferred intermediary), this won't stop Ukraine's gas prices from increasing significantly in the next few months. The ultimate driving force will be simple, rational self-interest: why sell at under $200 per m³ to Ukraine when Europe will soon be paying over $300 per m³ to Europe?

The price rise has already been foreshadowed: a month ago Russia increased the price it pays Central Asia for gas. This was not out of generosity: it was a revision to preempt hard bargaining by Central Asia, or (much worse for Russia) actual progress on alternative gas routes to Europe that don't include it (one of them is Tymoshenko's White Stream project, lauded by The Economist, which would be a great use of her considerable political skills if she weren't too busy in Kyiv). Russia's price increase is likely to be passed on to Europe in the near future, and Ukraine should not expect to be far behind.

We should not be distracted from this issue. Yes, another Russian general has threatened to attack Ukraine militarily (and with "other methods" as well), and responding in a professional manner was important. Yes, Kommersant claims Putin said Ukraine "isn't a real nation" and it will "cease to exist" if it joins NATO (a claim his government has not refuted). Ukrainian politicians should remember this when dealing with Russia (Hey, Yanukovych, you've been shouting a lot about Ukrainian national sovereignty at anti-NATO rallies—refresh my memory, when did any NATO ally threaten that as much as Putin just did?). Nevertheless, the real motive force in the gas sphere will be the $100 per m³ price differential. Either Russia will take payment in cash, or in ownership of Ukrainian energy assets, but it won't sit for long without payment.

I don't know when the hike will come. Gazprom may not know, and maybe not even the Russian government. But since the Russian government doesn't like NATO and doesn't think Tymoshenko is going to give it anything in exchange for the discount pricing, the hike will certainly come this year. If Russia is looking to improve its chances of getting paid, it may hike them this summer or wait until inflation is more under control, so it doesn't catch Ukraine when it is more desperate. If it wants to shake Ukraine up more it may load on the hike about the same time that inflation problems come to a head.

Not Even Together Enough To Host A Soccer Match

Inadequate preparation for Euro 2012 should be a big issue. There is $25 billion more investment that needs to be made, Ukraine's reputation is on the line—this should be a cause for major concern. But, because the government has gotten into an inflationary and budgetary mess that dwarfs even this event, all that I'll do is note that it's still a problem. I will add, though, that it particularly unhelpful to see Yushchenko blithely state that everything is going smoothly despite warnings from Ukraine's host partner Poland and the Euro 2012 committee.

Tymoshenko Should Support Klitchko 

Below inflation, gas prices, Euro 2012, somewhere under corruption in public transportation, is the Kyiv mayoral election. And yet, the politicians of an entire nation are occupying themselves with this single city election.

Tymoshenko doesn't need to look very far to know what she should do in this situation: all she needs to do is remember her own decision ahead of the 2004 presidential election.

In 2004 she gave up her own candidacy in order to support Yushchenko, despite her ego and despite the animosity between them that is unlikely to have emerged fully-formed in January of 2005. The reason she did so was that she did not have a real chance at the presidency (her public popularity was in the low teens, I believe), but Yushchenko needed help to overcome his opponent Yanukovych. Divided, their two parties could have both lost a legitimate election to Yanukovych. In doing the right thing, Tymoshenko also earned enough voter support to improve her political rating far beyond anything she had had thusfar.

Tymoshenko should support Klitchko. Like Tymoshenko in 2004, Turchynov in 2008 is little more than a spoiler. This is especially true since the mayoral election, unlike the presidential, is decided without a runoff (though BYuT is trying to change this). If Turchynov and Klitchko fight one another, it is likely that both will lose to to Chornovetsky, whi is still polling above 30% popularity.

In a real, monetary way, Ukrainians cannot afford to watch BYuT and NUNS continue to squabble. If Tymoshenko makes the magnanimous step here, not only will it improve the nation's chances in the upcoming crises, but likely result in voters rewarding her as they did after 2004.

"The Russian president spoke about Georgia calmly, but lost his temper on the issue of Ukraine, said a source on the delegation of a NATO member state. Putin told his American colleague that Ukraine was not a proper state but an Eastern European territory, a substantial part of which had been presented to it by Russia. The source said Putin had openly hinted that if Ukraine were admitted to NATO, it would cease to exist as a state. In other words, he threatened to start the procedure for the secession of the Crimea and Ukraine's eastern regions." (RIA Novosti commenting on a story in Kommersant)(Newsru)

And over at Kremlin Inc, Hans reports on the story also in russian press that industrial espionage has been afoot in dealings between Ukraine and Gazprom.   

(деза - deza - abbreviated form of the word meaning disinformation)

Nothing Ukraine seems to be doing recently has warranted praise from its eastern neighbor. Not diversification in its suppliers of nuclear fuel (RIA Novosti, PA Tribune Review), nor honoring 1932-33 famine victims (Guardian, UNIAN, Observer) and most certainly not its Nato aspirations. (UNIAN, UNIAN)

But most distressing for me, is the silence regarding gas negotiations. Is "no news, good news"??? "Naftogaz Ukrainy and Gazprom plan to resume their gas talks in Moscow on April 3. “Our delegation will leave for Moscow tomorrow for further talks,” Naftogaz Ukrainy chief spokesman Valentin Zemlyansky said on Wednesday. He said Naftogaz Ukrainy Board Chairman Oleg Dubina was having consultations with the government to specify the Ukrainian delegation’s position. It was reported earlier that the next round of talks between the two companies had been held in Moscow on March 31 and April 1, but no details were disclosed." (Itar Tass)

And oh yeah, Naftohaz is bankrupt.  (not morally, silly... financially ;)

Apparently he admires North Korean-style negotiation tactics

When a Russian general recently waved the country's nukes at Europe in an effort to intimidate people, I thought to myself, "How smart, if reprehensible, of Putin to let his military advisors threaten nuclear attack (excuse me, nuclear preemptive defense) on whomever the government and army think is encroaching on the country's interests. Now he can tut-tut about over-enthusiastic generals and Europe gets reminded what real loonies are within grasping distance of power if his government relaxes its chokehold on the country."

Now Putin has gone and said something very similar (a fact IIU mentioned earlier) His exact words:

It is horrible to say and terrifying to think that Russia could target its missile systems at Ukraine, in response to deployment of such installations on Ukrainian territory. Imagine this for a moment. This is what worries us.

Why is Putin telling us these horrible thoughts of his now? He implies that it is a reaction to Ukraine thinking of targeting missiles at Russia. But what on earth could he be talking about? He can't be accusing Ukraine of targeting nuclear weapons the way Russian generals are targeting them: Ukraine shipped its nukes to Russia years ago. The only possible missiles he might be referring to are NATO missiles: not targeted as such, but rather allowed into Ukraine as part of a NATO missile defense grid, as in the Baltic countries. While this is what Putin is referring to, his threat is so pre-emptive, and the Ukrainian government so obviously unthreatening, that it is not a credible reason why he is saying this now.

Pulling a Knife On a Guy Who's "Looking At Me Funny" 

To be absolutely clear, Putin is threatening Ukraine not for entering NATO, not for thinking of entering NATO, but for thinking about asking NATO for a plan to see what NATO has to offer before holding a national referendum to ask Ukrainian voters whether or not they'd like to join (the same reason, by the way, for the Pary of Region's Circus of Obstructionism). Even should Ukraine be granted a plan, it would take years before the country would be able to meet the necessary criteria for NATO entry, on top of however much time it would take to convince Ukrainians to vote for starting the undertaking.

For this reason, the idea that Putin is reacting against a real and present threat against Russia is laughable. Instead he is threatening an attack on a peaceful Ukraine for what is essentially thoughtcrime: for wanting to consider what NATO has to offer and what it would require of Ukraine as a member.

On Gas, Too, Cold Threats from Moscow

Russian government-controlled Gazprom also recently gave Ukraine a whopping four days' notice to pay off gas debts to Russia before it turned off the tap. To get things in order: the threat to freeze Ukrainians was just before Yushchenko's visit to Moscow, the threat to blow them up was during the visit.

The linked article from Eurasia Home Analytical Resource (EHAR) gives a nice summary of why Ukraine is in the situation it is. Essentially the trick has been to offer gas at cut-market prices and then organize the deal in such a way that the money from the deals goes to nontransparent intermediaries (also controlled by Russia) and from there into the hands of wealthy businesspeople, thus leaving Ukrainian state gas company Naftohaz bankrupt and giving Gazprom an opening to try to expropriate gas assets to cover the debts.

This is the reason the Economist's advice is essentially to pay European prices ($300 instead of $179), reciprocate with higher transit fees charged to Russia, and take all the reform pain now. As the Economist sees it, this will be excruciatingly hard, but better than giving Russia the ability to extract potentially larger concessions later by use of threat. And, unfortunately, the half-measure worked out during Yushchenko's visit (the price is still $179, but Ukraine will have to accept a new intermediary, allowing a continuation of the same scam and the same inevitable bankruptcy, or allow the price to rise to $300) just buys time. I wholeheartedly agree. To the the response that Ukraine can't pay that much the answer is simple: it already is, and Gazprom just makes everything clearer by waving its hand over the cutoff valve.

Small Carrots 

There are those in Ukraine who benefit from the current gas deals and from missile-waving. By threatening all of Ukraine with death and destruction, the Russian government may be helping PoR, which has lately picked up NATO protest as an excuse for making it impossible to pass any legislation. If Ukrainians are more worried about the missiles than about the results of letting Ukraine be bullied, the PoR deputies may win the NATO battle. And while Naftohaz goes bankrupt, the handful of nontransparent owners of the RosUkrEnego intermediary have made millions, perhaps billions.

The most disappointing aspect of the Russian government's interactions with the West in general and Ukraine in specific is that its threats are broadcast so widely and its enticements channeled so narrowly.

speculation on the future of the Ukrainian oil and gas industry

Yuliya Tymoshenko is back and (I find the pun leaping to my typing fingers with the speed of inevitability) she's been cooking with gas. In addition to a whole raft of proposed economic reforms (including the TTI--Tymoshenko Transparency Index--which contains some admirable goals, but is ever-so amusingly self-absorbed) she's been promoting big-time gas and industry changes.

RosUkrEnergo and UkrHazEnergo

The new news is her statement that Yushchenko and the National Security and Defence Council have agreed to eliminate the RosUkrEnergo intermediary from Ukrainian-Russian natural gas trade. If true, this will be a victory for her, as she has long opposed the intermediary (for solid economic reasons, as described in detail in this article, though  the article does get embarrassingly laudatory at times). At another conference on the plans for her visit to Russia (Feb 21-22), Tymoshenko repeated that should be no intermediary. This despite the overall " harmony and understand" theme she was working on to try to put a diplomatic face on things (the Russian government has on occasion attempted to distance itself from RosUkrEnergo, likely because its lack of transparency makes it highly suspicious to the kind of energy investors Russia would like to woo, but has also never showed itself eager to eliminate the company from trade relations; Yushchenko has certainly couched his support for continuing the intermediary in "keep Russia happy" terms).

Moreover, Russia itself seems to be helping her. I thought I was going to be the first to make this connection and bring you some real news instead of bloggy conglomerations, but then I found this article at the Eurasia Heritage Foundation (anyone know something about this source?). The writer, John Marone, also noticed with interest the arrest of Seyon Mogilevich by the Russian government. The Eurasia Daily Monitor article details two prevailing theories on the arrest (that it was done by opponents of Medvedev to show they're still relevant or by Putin to put Mogilevich where he won't be talking to reporters), but Marone was more interested in how Tymoshenko might be able to use the arrest, since Mogilevich happened to be the major Russian participant in that very same RosUkrEnergo scheme.

He reports her statement on the arrest:

“The presence of additional middlemen is a sign of specific corrupt activities. The recent arrests demonstrate that the international community is following events and will not allow the development of any shadow models, including among states bordering the EU. Therefore, my position remains unchanged: all shadowy middlemen will be shut down.”

Nothing surprising there, but her discussions with them at the end of February should be fun to watch.

The White Line 

Simultaneously, she's kick-started discussion of another gas pipeline route, one that would bypass Russia but travel through Ukraine on its way to Europe. This comes at a time when another Russian-bypass pipe project proposed by EU countries themselves (Nabucco) has been foundering. (In an article called Pipedreams published the week before her announcement, Economist described the situation.)

How seriously should we take this? To put things bluntly: this sounds a lot like another Odesa-Brody pipeline and we don't hear much about that these days. Before Tymoshenko's White Line, it was the big pipeline project that was going to get Central Asian oil to Europe without Russia. As the linked RFE-RL article points out, though, Ukraine failed to find the oil to pump under Kuchma, and it's been pumping Russian oil the opposite way since 2004. While there is a prospective extension of that pipeline to Plock, there are still a lot of questions. To create another line to meet whatever unknown demand is left over with as-yet unknown supply does not seem particularly promising.

Nevertheless, even having the option on the table is a bargaining chip. And a reasonable argument can be made that a major reason for the failure of Odesa-Brody was a lack of government will to push it through and risk Russian retaliation (in forms such as raising the then-bargain natural gas rates), a lack Tymoshenko has never felt.

So throwing this idea sounds like fun to me, though I can't see why she called it the White Line and not something more like, say, TymoTunnel.

WTO and, Why Not?, the EU

Ukraine finished WTO bilateral negotiations this January (this was not a Tymoshenko thing; rather it was a steady if obscenely slow process pushed along by the last four government formations). Should the WTO officially welcome in Ukraine at its Feb 5 meeting, as Yushchenko has predicted, there will definitely need to be further reform and efforts to harmonize standards (referred to by the Ukrainian agriculture minister and indirectly by Yushchenko in his call for Tymoshenko to oversee the transition process for the grain sector). Nevertheless, Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin makes his government look rather spiteful and self-absorbed for saying Ukraine (after fourteen years of negotiation; the first ten of which were a wash) has recklessly rushed in "on unfavorable terms just to get in ahead of Russia."

However long we've been waiting for this move, that Ukraine will be getting into the WTO soon is a reason for a little bit of celebrating. Tymoshenko did so by proposing that the EU join Ukraine in a free trade zone and share joint visas with it.

The strategy reminds me of an old Calvin and Hobbes comic I once read:

"Mom, can I set fire to my bed mattress?"
"No, Calvin."
"Can I ride my tricycle on the roof?"
"No, Calvin."
"Then can I have a cookie?"
"No, Calvin."
"She's on to me." 

Who knows, maybe the EU reps will be squishier than Mrs., uh... Mrs. Calvin's Mom. (Then can we have an EU *action plan*?...)

The following may have some appeal in some appeal in it's "quirkyiness" and convoluted logic "NATO and Ukraine: who needs the other more?"

But the following is DOWNRIGHT TERRIFYING esp. in it's use of the word "preventively" when applied to the use of nuclear weapons. "Russian General Yuri Baluyevsky, who declared over the weekend on government-owned national television that "We do not intend to attack anyone, but we consider it necessary for all our partners in the world community to clearly understand that to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons." (Publius Pundit)

And imho I do hope that Edward Lucas has a section relating to relations with Ukraine in his upcoming study. "The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the West". (mentioned in "We must not cave in to the spookocracy in the Kremlin" Times Online)

BYT and OU-PSD united against a deputy in Zhytomyr oblast, Irene Sinyavskoy, for basicly doing a lousy job. In Zhytomyr btw five people have died from freezing to death.

Eurasian group which vandalized Mt. Hoverla are at it again, this time in Moscow protesting and vandalizing the Holodomor exhibit about the millions who died from forced starvation 1932-33 in Ukraine. They entered into the cultural center and started kinocking over the exhibit stands. Three youths were turned over to the Russian police by security guards. Ukraine has filed a protest with the RF over the incident. (Could make some cracks about how free speech is alive and well in Russia esp. if it is anti-Ukrainian but with the new visa rules for Ukrainian citizens in Russia coming down the pipe - don't want to make any waves.)

Pres. Yushchenko is calling for people to light a candle in memorium for the many millions who passed away in the Holodomor. Yesterday was the start of the days remembering that tragedy in Ukrainian history. Oksana Bilozir has a new music clip called, "Candle" (hat tip to elmer for video link) about the tragedy which was shown as part of yesterday's ceremonies in Kyiv. Nov. 24  is the official day commemorating the tragedy and "Light a Candle" will be observed in Ukraine and abroad. 

(and would ordinarily link to the ukr and eng versions in regards to Pres. Yushchenko's words but the eng. lang. version is not up yet - two days later.)

A hit in the Kerch Strait between a Russian and a Cambodian ship. Thankfully, although there are holes in both ships there was no further damage to the catastrophically hit area.

Web site for children's Ombudsman opened on the official site for Vinnytsia city. (Could not locate on the site but could be that simply could not find it.) Today, also is "Student's Day" in Ukraine.

Yesterday there was a bomb scare at Kyiv's main train terminus but none was located.

     Watching news stories can lead to conundrums like how to explain that one news story states that a dam will be constructed (full stop) while the other makes it seem that a dike is still undecided and under consideration. Personally, my bets are on that a dam will be constructed and voila! will be used as a causeway. The issue of Russia building a causeway to Tuzla Island goes way back (BBC News story). But it takes a special type of skullduggery to turn an ecological disaster into a plus, while offering no material or financial assistance to Ukraine even though the sea traffic through the Kerch Strait was a ticking time bomb.

"Crunching through oil-crusted seashells scattered on fouled beaches among dead and dying birds, exhausted volunteers fumed Wednesday about the uneven distribution of Russia's petroleum wealth. ...  "Somebody is making millions of dollars by selling oil and sending those ancient tankers to our shore, ready to sink at any minute," said Alexander Gayduk, a middle-age farmworker from nearby Taman. "But they are not here to help with this mess, are they? Where are the trucks? Where is the heavy machinery we need?" (Seattle Times)

In fact, Russia may decide to hold Ukraine responsible for the catastrophe in Kerch Strait.  

"The largest sea disaster in the modern history of Russia and Ukraine is turning into a political scandal. Deputy head of the Russian Federal Natural Resources Supervision Service (Rosprirodnadzor) Oleg Mitvol has proposed building a temporary dam from Tuzla Spit, which is Ukrainian territory and has been an island since the 1920s, to the Russian shore. Mitvol says that is the only way to prevent the pollution of the Sea of Azov with fuel oil from the recent oil spill the Strait of Kerch. The idea has caused a storm of emotion in Ukraine. Ukrainian politicians see the proposal as a renewal of an old land dispute and Russian electioneering. " (Kommersant)

Russia intends to apply new migration rules for Ukrainians - "It means that Ukrainian citizens, who will enter the Russian territory for a period of more than three days, will have to be registered as migrants."

   This is a little "goofy" because the last time that in Russia there were changes to immigration (which were implemented in Jan. of this year), Ukrainians, as well as everyone had to register - time consuming, logistical nightmare - which just meant that it made it harder for Ukrainians to work in Russia. This is imp. to Russia as they 'need' and 'want' that labor force. Need it based on demographics (just the other day Putin was sounding off about needing more engineers) while want it as Ukrainians are more desirable labor force than those from Caucaus or from the East. And it means that the Ukrainian gov't will be fully justified in "that if Russia introduces these rules for Ukrainian citizens, Ukraine will have to introduce the same registration for Russian citizens in Ukraine." Well, must mean that someone in Duma/Kremlin is upset with Ukraine.

"Gazprom Tuesday said it would limit deliveries of gas to Ukraine, if Kiev does not pay accounts for fuel delivered to the end of October, the firm's official spokesman Sergey Kupryanov told the Russian news agency, Interfax. Kupryanov said that the Russian gas monopolist had carried out its contractual commitments, but Ukraine had "systematically defaulted on its terms of the contract." (article)

Debt is reported to be over $1.3 billion dollars.

Update: At a press conference, Oct. 3rd, Minister of Finance Azarov stated that Ukraine has no debt to Gazprom and that  Gazprom is not owed one cent. (UNIAN) Minister of Energy Boiko has gone to Moscow for talks with Gazprom and PM Yanukovych could make the trip to Moscow in the coming days.

Oct. 3rd
From Deputy Fuel-Energy Minister of Ukraine Vadym Chuprun 

"At the same time, he noted the government plans to investigate which exactly of operators at the market has the debt at $1.3 billion. “We have accumulated enough gas in our underground depositories, and Ukraine fulfills all its obligations to its European consumers”, the deputy Minister stressed. V.Chuprun did not connect the Gazprom statement with the parliamentary election in Ukraine. At the same time, according to him, the visit of Fuel-Energy Minister Yuri Boyko to Moscow is not connected with this issue as well. “The Minister will discuss in Moscow the issues, connected with oil transit trough the Ukrainian territory in 2008”, V.Chuprun specified." (UNIAN)

Additional Update: "reports emerged from Russia today (Oct. 3) that a deal had already been reached in connection the debt." which Boyko was part of so Chuprun's statement is negated. (Recommended article from Radio Free Europe)

the kid nobody wants on his team 

After a few opening forays last month (a couple promises to voters snuck into other speeches as politicians tried to sneak past campaign laws here and there), the pitches are flying. Here's a helpful roundup of political slogans of the month, from ForUm. What do you all say: in this group of pitches, which are the foul balls, and which are the strikes?

And among the former orange parties, the repositioning continues. Current poll ratings indicate that the joint group of Yushchenko's Nasha Ukrayina (NU) and Lutsenko and Kyrylenko's National Self-Defense (NS) in a single bloc (NUNS) has already draw quite close to the ratings of Tymoshenko's BYuT. (Must... control urge to make "Nuns on the Run" jokes, must... control urge...). There is even some discussion of a BYuT and NUNS uniting for another election.

One development that may help NU reunite with BYuT is that it continues to sideline some of the opposing friends in its own ranks. The most recent two have been Yekhanurov and Bezsmirtniy. I've never thought much of Bezsmirtniy as a politician. so seeing him go seems like a good move to me. Yekhanurov, I'll admit I liked back when he became PM. I would have preferred no break with BYuT to having him, but he talked some economic sense and I was amazed at how much Zerkalo Nedeli seemed to like him.

He's always been part of the "rapprochement with Yanukovych before Tymoshenko" wing of NU, though, so in the interest of seeing Ukrainian voters get some options in the election, it's probably best that he's getting shunted back to the minor leagues off in Dnipropetrovsk.

Yushchenko maintaining his Kuchma-era stance, and abandoning it

However, in a way very similar to his past behavior Yushchenko is again trying court oligarchs at the same time as he's uniting with anti-oligarch parties. Here he is taking an active hand in ousting his own PoR-friendly deputies because they're losing voters for him, as well as trying to rescue NU by bringing it together with more confrontational anti-oligarch parties, but at the same time trying to appeal to oligarchs? I really don't get what his angle is, and it can't help his relations with either NS or BYuT to be chumming with their avowed opponents, let alone voters.

More troubling still than his reverting to past form is a contradiction pointed out by Zerkalo Nedeli: Yushchenko is also agitating for reforms to the Constitution that would increase presidential power, move the country towards authoritarianism, and create "a coffin for Ukrainian democracy". The quote isn't mine, and it isn't ZN's, either. It's Yushchenko 2000's quote, when Kuchma proposed exactly the same raft of reforms. Now would be a good time for him to cut the hypocrisy and work with what he's got.

The all center-rightist candidate list

 One group of people that no one is making overtures to now, though, is the Socialists. I've mentioned this fact in the last couple entries, but wanted to at least pause in this one to contemplate this important point. With the Socialists on their way out, by all poll numbers, and the Communists reduced to perhaps 5-6% of the Rada at most, Ukrainians electoral choices seem to include no significant leftist groups.

First take a look at the other parties to see where they're located. BYuT, like it's founder has ever been more populist than leftist; much more likely to dance around the middle where they might win points with voters on both sides than run out and stake an reduced-free-market stance. NS is pretty much a one-note party, with the note being "fight corruption". In any case, Lutsenko wasn't sufficiently devoted to left-leaning policies to give up a chance to join in a block with NU. NU has always had its allies in big business, and even if they're being sidelined now, Yushchenko seems determined to make new ones. That leaves, PoR, which has more big business ties than any other party in the Rada, and thus has even less incentive than they do to take a leftist stand that would damage those ties.

All of which means that Ukrainians can choose from different personalities this September, but not substantially different ideologies. What an amazingly narrow breadth of choice! Their ballot slips are going to look almost like Soviet-era store shelves: only a few things to choose from, and not much to differentiate any them.

This being a speculation about a non-phenomenon (the lack of left) I really don't have any links or events to hang this section on. But I would certainly love opinions and speculation on the potential effects of this imbalance.

Ideas? 

Yushchenko seems surprised Yanukovych doesn't want to go back

It's a bit late for Yushchenko to try to reign in Yanukovych. Since the laws addressing power distribution between the President and PM are vague, a lot of what each can do depends on what each tries to do. No prize for guessing who's winning.

Last week Yanukovych used his power to halt NATO ascension. EDM describes this as Yushchenko and his NSNU party's object lesson in what their "Grand Coalition" will get them.

But NATO isn't the biggest issue on the table. Recently, I found out why the WTO wasn't getting much press recently; Yanukovych has put the breaks on that process as well. The Kyiv Post surmises that this is because he wants to appease Russia by advocating synchronized entry. And last but not least, he's trying to fire all the governors the orange team hired last year, in the name of reform, of course.

Yushchenko's so powerless, his only countermaneuver has been to stop attending Cabinet meetings. His party has suggested Yanukovych should resign. How proactive.

Tymoshenko's sounding happy to be back in opposition; back to her usual feisty speeches. She's even cheekily extended the hand to NU to come join her. And, to a limited extent, it's worked. Some former NSNU allies have already joined her, others may as well.

Russian Relations 

Yanukovych has met with Russian oil companies execs and is increasing the amount being pumped. He came back promising lower gas prices but don't bet on it. There is, of course, the chance that certain unnamed concessions could be made to the Russian government, but as I've mentioned before, neither the government nor Gazprom has looked willing to extend Ukraine's discount days.

Smart move here: the Russian foreign ministry is now bringing up accusations that Ukraine discriminates against Russian and Russians. As I mentioned earlier, Yanukovych and the Party of Regions had promised preferential treatment for the Russian language during the campaign. That promise has recently languished as they've been addressing other matters. For the Russian state to be agitating now is a good political move to keep the language issue on the front burner. It might work, we'll see.

In any case, pro-Russian interests have already gotten another little bonus on the side. While Tarasyuk was appealing to the UN to recognize the Holodomor famine as an act of genocide, the Ukrainian government was, quietly, put off spending any money on a real memorial.

Shucks

After ten days, I was kinda expecting more in the way of news. Things basically just seem to be rumbling along in the same direction, on a macro-level.

I definitely have to start looking into getting some more pictures up.

I remember this dance from 1994

On Aug 21, Ukrainian authorities found the bullet-ridden body of the top anti-organized crime official in Donetsk, Roman Yerokhin, just a week before erecting a new monument to Vyacheslav Chornovil, nationalist politician (who died sandwiched between long-haul trucks a few months before the presidential election in which he was to run). So while Yushchenko tries to convince Ukrainians he's going to launch a new inquiry into Chornovil's murder, another skeleton walks to the end of the line. (Foreign Notes has been all over this case, describing: Lutsenko's typically vague statement that "we know he's a Donetsk businessman", his claim that the murders have been detained, the small likelihood those that orderd the hit will be prosecuted by the do-nothing PG Medvedko, and more of the usual you-know-who ridiculousness Ukrainian news agencies are always panning off as news rather than gossip (this time that the person who ordered the hit was a BYUT deputy whose name begins with "Sh"). As soon as I get my hands on a picture of the guy, I'll get him up on Skeletons.

In industrial news: as expected, the Yanukovych Cabinet is also putting a stop to any further privatization of Ukrainian state assets like the hugely successful Krivoryzhstal (re-)privatization. Meanwhile the actual campaign promises Yanukovych and his party made have all gotten sidelined, as I pointed out a few weeks ago, and Tymoshenko mocked him for yesterday.

The only solid blow against corruption has landed, though. It fell on Pavlo Lazarenko, former PM, who was convicted of money laundering and sentenced to nine years in prison. Oh... wait, Lazarenko was convicted in the US. Pretty sad for Ukraine that the only bandit to go to prison was living abroad. On the other hand, I'm proud of my country for nailing the bastard. My congratulation to the US judicial branch and San Francisco circuit court in specific.

"Grand Coalition" Not Yet Finalized

So, pretty much a full return to the Kuchma era. But don't worry, says Yushchenko, if the ministers in the Cabinet get out of line I'll make sure they resign. What power he's going to use to do this is unclear, but not nearly as unclear as how he plans to fulfil his promise that all state money be used "for the benefit of the poor, social programs, the army, in other words – for the welfare of Ukraine". Let me get this straight: he can't keep his own party in line, he couldn't stop his opponent from getting into power, but now we're supposed to believe he's got the power to coerce the Party of Regions into becoming a philanthropic government?

Yushchenko's party, meanwhile, seems to be attempting to make the coalition with PoR-Socialists-Communists as unproductive as the Orange coalition. In fact, the coalition is apparently still under discussion. Maybe this is supposed to be a sneaky way to cut down on corruption: drag out discussions so long that no one can get anything done (For a prediction of what the final outcome will look like, I recommend the Kyiv Post's article on Kyiv politics as a possible foreshadowing).

Natural Gas Prices Not Finalized, Either

Regional governments will get a say in the planning of the 2007 budget, promised Yanukovych. Ukraine won't steal any gas this winter, he also promised, but he wouldn't speculate on what price the country is going to be paying (though hinting it might rise "a little" due to world price trends). First Vice PM Azarov was less optimistic, saying the price won't be less than $135/1000cu m.

Regions of Ukraine deputies suddenly sound like a bunch of Kuchma acolytes

What a difference power makes! Gone is the Party of Regions (PoR) that stumped it for all the hot-button issues in the East. Gone is the party that represented "half of a divided country" as so many AP articles told me. In its place is a whole horde of little(-er) Kuchmas willing to drop any demand so long as it doesn't threaten their power or avenues for graft.

In the process, they're making all those PoR voters look like suckers. As expected.

First the bad news, and there's quite a bit of it: journalists are feeling the pinch again as "incidents" against them increase, Yanukovych has recently signed through a Cabinet decree allowing civil servants to be fired with less warning, Akhmetov is threatening to try to get Krivoryzhstal back, and (as I describe below) WTO accession is looking shakier and gas issues hazier. (thanks to Foreign Notes and frequent commenter IIU for most of these points)

WTO Accession - Like a Software Release Date

I've got to admit: I am in the dark about what's going on with Ukraine's WTO bid. According to UNIAN, on 8 Aug, Yanukovych suggested Ukraine might not join until 2007, while Tarasyuk was still adamant that accession will happen this year. The next day, Kinakh managed to agree with both of them; how's that for a political trick! (Ok, factually he only agreed with both that it should happen "soon", but still...) "Soon," says Yushchenko's Economic secretary, too.

And then a couple days ago, a new word from Yanukovych, more optimistic than the last. Now he is saying that Ukraine's been trying so long, it really should make it into the WTO this year, though "It would be wrong if we conceded on positions which would damage our market and our manufacturers."

The vagueness makes me suspicious that the deal won't go through until 2007.

Natural Gas For Influence
gas price extended through the end of the year. This despite Turkmenistan's stated aim of increasing its own price to Russia to $100/1000cu m. Should that take place, The Russian government will be selling gas to Ukraine at rates below the price it pays to suppliers. This before Yanukovych has even made it to Russia to negotiate. (although I'm also reading that this is not yet an agreement, but just a pronouncement from Yanukovych without official Russian confirmation yet, or something "being agreed upon")One other thing Yanukovych has decided: RosUkrEnergo is probably not so bad after all.failed to secure a deal on gas. Large price hikes and shortages are now imminent. I'm inclined to believe it, considering the thrust of the other two puzzling articles I placed after EDM. Looks like I'm going to have to downgrade my estimations of EDM, huh. In their defense, for quite some time they've been very reliable. I sincerely hope this doesn't indicate a downward trend.

The new news, of course, is great. If Yanukovych is having difficulties in negotiations and even he is suggesting price hikes to $150/ 1000cu m minimum, that means Russia is demanding real-world rates. A real, economically-based, agreement would not presuppose any backroom sell-out. It would mean clear negotiation based on national (and business) self-interest.

I can quote the same article referenced below, but now from the most optimistic option, rather than second-best:

Outcome 1: The Russian government takes the principled position that Russia should be selling gas to Ukraine openly at market rates - good policy which moves Ukrainian-Russian relations in a positive direction, good for forcing Ukrainian development along a sustainable route, good for reinforcing Ukrainian independence, and damaging to Yanukovych's credibility (as a bonus).

The following conclusions are therefore, happily, no longer applicable. Very comforting.

A couple postings ago I described what [a maintained $95 price] would mean: the Russian government is not interested in transparent economic relations with its neighbors. When it looked like the former orange blocs would continue in power, Putin repeatedly threatened to hike the price and now: suddenly the Russian government has decided it didn't really want to make an (economic) profit after all.

The price that will be paid will instead be determined in backroom deals. Russia will sell at ostensibly cut-rate prices expecting non-economic returns that are never announced to Ukrainian citizens (or any others, for that matter, including Russians). With all the secrecy, it doesn't require a terribly suspicious mind to wonder if unscrupulous Ukrainian politicians (like Boyko, back to his oily, gassy business as Minister now) might be selling out their nations at a discount, in exchange for kickbacks.]

A Couple Happy Side-Effects of the PoR Resurgence

There aren't many, granted, but there are some. Most of them got helpfully summed up by Vitrenko in her whine about how Yanukovych betrayed PoR voters. Essentially, while RoU will be concentrating its efforts on corruption and corrosion of the rule of law, it won't be focusing on any of the divisive issues it campaigned about.

Chief among its shifts is its quick backpedaling on the language issue. Like I said from the start: the language issue was just vote-gathering rhetoric with no real RoU deputy support. Tossing it to Yushchenko like a bone was the easiest decision they made. Of course the best option is if the language issue remains on the table enough to reach some sort of compromise, but I'd take neglect over a quickie conversion to dual state languages.

the port's quiet, the protests are over, and NATO is backAnother is that NATO military exercises got ok'd by the Rada and are happening again in Crimea. This is great. Regardless of whether or not Ukraine eventually joins (which I believe has always required a referendum, though perhaps this might have been a RoU win), it's a better diplomatic stance to at least look amenable. Vitrenko can't be to happy to see RoU voicing support for Crimean Tatars, either. (pic: VOA)

And finally, the Constitutional Court is back in action. 

Lutsenko Is Still Better Than Any Other Cabinet Member

As I said in my last entry, I was disappointed to see Lutsenko go back on his word by continuing to serve as Internal Affairs Minister under Yanukovych. It would have been nice to have seen a Ukrainian politician keeping his word for a change. (here's his excuse - short version, and his excuse - long version; for a fun comparison, here's Moroz's excuse for cutting a deal with Yanukovych. A question for you, Mr. Frosty: If you're so opposed to Yanukovych's policies, why didn't you just refuse to support any candidate?)

But I can't say I'm devastated Lutsenko will still be around. After all, he was a decent Minister; certainly I'm a lot happier to see him still there than to see Zvarych back in the Cabinet. It also looks like he may just be able to use his powers as a check against other Cabinet members.

my goodness

Ukraine has a Parliament again. It's lead by Yanukovych, and it includes the Communists (over protests from NSNU). Some NSNU deputies and almost all BYT deputies either withheld their votes or voted against the nomination of the cabinet,  but the nomination nonetheless passed easily. Those NSNU deputies who opposed it have expressed desires to join in general political opposition, but, of course, the strength of their convictions have not yet been tested. [pic: Voice of America]

Yanukovych gets a new CabinetThe US has sent its diplomatic congratulations, and recently the US Ambassador attended talks with PM Yanukovych. US embassy personnel and the US government are likely not thrilled by the new government, probably closer to the opinions in the article "Don't Give Up On Ukraine", written by former US Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascal. But this is a good time for diplomacy and businesslike international relations. I'm glad the US is making good-faith gestures. Of course Putin also sent his congrats. I found Channel 5's short comment on the subject amusing.

Of course BYT is in opposition, but in a surprising turnaround, Lutsenko has gone for pragmatism and power over his earlier promises of principled opposition. I'm not so sure his recent hospitalization for hypertension got diagnosed right. Have they tested for pangs of conscience?

Initial Illiberal Economic Legislation

According to a statement from [First Vice PM] Azarov, some of the first legislation the new Cabinet will look at is economic (more from the AP).  It involves restarting some tax-privileged zones (bad idea; they are unfair and an invitation to corruption) and also deciding on compensation to be provided to investors who've suffered over the last year and a half (As if the most disadvantaged group in Ukraine has been the small minority of wealthy stockholders).

Funny enough, the majority of the advantages from these illiberal economic moves will accrue to the Donbas industrial area, or, more specifically, to Donbas area industrialists. Yushchenko has called it a mistake, but that's the most he can do about it.

Having this be the Yanu Cabinet's opening move is pretty disheartening. Four more years like this would be horrible for the economy. More to come soon, especially regarding oil and gas.

There are some benefits simply from having a government, though. Along with nominating Yanukovych, Yushchenko signed off on a document stating that the Dec 2004 Constitutional amendments that stripped him of some of his powers will not be brought to the as-yet-unformed Constitutional Court.  Since most lawmakers didn't want to see Yushchenko get a chance to regain those powers, they'd avoided nominating any CC candidates as a form of filibuster. This new piece of legislation will most likely expedite the process considerably.

Hunker Management

My feelings on the issue largely reflect those in Zerkalo Nedeli (pardon the pun; you can hold the one in the title against me, though).

It's going to be an unpleasant next few years. It's likely that "the country that has lately forgotten the meaning of the phase 'tax authorities as a tool of administrative pressure' will have a chance to recollect it; on the other hand, the budget has a chance to take in more revenues." And this was the direct result of the Orange government's "failure to follow the principles it proclaimed and pursue the priorities it set". Nothing for it but to hold on tight.

Prime Minister Yanukovych is a better option than new elections

Yushchenko is currently refusing to acknowledge the new coalition and has threatened to dissolve the Parliament. BYT and NU deputies are using the same kinds of disruptive tactics RoU was using until last Friday. Protesters are in the streets, and some, like BYT are calling for new election.

Are these the right moves?

No. First because NU and the SPU have already destroyed the Orange coalition: it's gone. Attempts to try and bring it back will not succeed, and so there is no use in carrying on. The Party of Regions was able to use it's noise as a filibuster until it could reach a deal with the Socialists. NU and BYT don't even seem to be trying to win them back, so of what use is the agitation?

Take yet one more step back: the thing that was supposed to unite the economic liberals and conservatives in the orange coalition was supposed to be fighting corruption. It's pretty clear that it didn't and would not have in the future. What other cause should bring Ukrainians out in support of them?

Maxed Out On Political Promises

Even assuming there were a chance of bringing back the Orange coalition, neither new elections nor protests will help.

It's possible, in watching the distasteful display in Parliament these days, to forget about the even less tasteful parties that were swept out in the last election: Vitrenko's band, the Ne Takers (the only party with a less competent campaign than NU), and all the contenders on technicalities (two dozen of them!). It would have been nice if Pora had made the cut, but not nice enough to go through the whole mess again. Remember what it cost to eliminate the deadwood deputies: four months of political posturing, allegations, and smear. All this while deputies were too chicken to make any major decisions and problems became crises. Ukrainians should not be forced to endure another four months of this for the privilege of possibly seeing deadwood bob up in Parliament again.

Beyond this, the last election was free and fair: a procedural triumph at the very least. Will the next one be as fair when held under extraordinary circumstances and probably in a rush?

Now about the protests. For starters, read Foreign Notes:

There are tents cities going up from PORA and others but PR has them too. If there’s a call for protests now, what will it be for? Corruption? After the allegations that accompanied the dismissal of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko? People think that Our Ukraine is as corrupt as RoU... So what we would be left with is a call for protests over what amounts to political differences. "Come out and protest their forming a different coalition!" To paraphrase a quote from a movie, that’s a helluva a concept to have men die for. It just ain’t gonna work.

The Orange Revolution had a real, tangible goal. It was against documented illegal activity. And it was a grassroots effort, much more against political corruption than it was for Yushchenko, as I've always said.

Current protests are just gatherings of angry people lead by politicians. The result? Viktor Taran of BYT scaring off RoU deputies by firing rubber bullets in the air. And Oleh Kalashnikov of PoR one-upped him by assaulting a journalist, destroying the tape in his camera, lying and saying it never happened, then saying he was "provoked".

The OR camps were up two months without violent incident: these new ones obviously don't have the same heart.

The Deal

The PoR-CPU-SPU coalition is likely to be corrupt, backsliding, and anti-democratic. Here's what else it might be:

If the NU people do their messy deals with RoU, they may be able to leverage out the Communists in the process. That would be a big step towards having a government with at least a little common sense. Distasteful compromise like this might even bring enough sense to the government to deal with the host of inefficiencies in the economy (as described in this IMF paper).

NU, BYT and supporters of the former orange parties might as well let Yanukovych try to fulfill his promise to sort out the gas crisis. No way to lose, just consider the possible outcomes:

1. The Russian government takes the principled position that Russia should be selling gas to Ukraine openly at market rates - good policy which moves Ukrainian-Russian relations in a positive direction, good for forcing Ukrainian development along a sustainable route, good for reinforcing Ukrainian independence, and damaging to Yanukovych's credibility.
   
2. The Russian government inks an old Belarus-style cut-rate deal, Ukrainians pay less for gas, and we at least have more confirmation about how things really work in the neighbor to the north.
   
3. Actually, I'll amend that. It could be bad if Yanukovych sells off Ukrainian gas infrastructure in a fire sale, but one would expect that to tank his political career. This tends to dissuade rational politicians, unlike Yushchenko's party which is trying to give over control of the gas pipes, excuse me, "temporary joint control" of the pipes, to Gazprom. It's almost pathologically self destructive: Yushchenko is expending every effort to keep Yanukovych out of office just long enough for his people to forfeit control over a tremendous amount of Ukrainian infrastructure. The RoU-Reds can't do worse.
   

Letting the coalition stand also gives Ukraine a chance of getting into the WTO ahead of Russia (which may be getting closer, see this EDM article). If the only sound in the Rada is coming from noiseblowers, no progress will be possible. This is a time-sensitive issue: if Russia gains membership, and thus veto power, Ukraine's task will become exponentially more difficult.

Finally, there is at least a chance Ukraine can get a damn Constitutional Court. It's been over a year without any legal way to determine constitutionality. This has already complicated dozens of messes.

Lutsenko doesn't want to be a part of the Anti-Crisis CabinetFor these reasons, the neglect that will result from four months of non-government and the potential problems resulting from new elections are even worse than a PoR-CPU-SPU Cabinet. There is going to be corruption, the oligarchs will keep their power, and little progress is likely over the next five years. But the majorities in NU and the Socialists, by courting PoR, have already demonstrated that they didn't have the will to do otherwise.

What remains for Ukrainians interested in the democratic and economic development of their nation is only to try and support the deputies that behave least reprehensibly.

Lutsenko and Tymoshenko are looking good this week. [image - Axis]

 because with gas/electric prices headed way up, it's going to be a cold winter

The price of natural gas is already up 25%, and, as the Kyiv Post reports, it's set to rise another 85% in July. The government wants Naftogaz to cut UAH 4.8bn off its UAH 53bn in spending, and Naftogaz has responded by asking for a billion hryvnya subsidy. Electricity prices are set to go up an addition 25% (on top of 25% already implemented), along with train tickets and phone rates.

As many commentators have said, the higher prices are necessary to spur industry to perform long-overdue capital improvements. But in the meantime, it's going to be quite difficult for Ukrainians to keep the lights on the the apartments warm this winter, and tickets to Crimea this summer aren't coming cheap.

The Shape of the Natural Gas Agreement To Come

In the middle of this, the current natural gas deal with Russia (never a great one) is going to get renegotiated or replaced. This isn't official yet, but it would be hard to find a major participant in the current deal who thinks otherwise.

Tymoshenko has objected strongly to the deal from the start. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that she's already started sizing it up for replacement. When she becomes PM today (barring a major collapse, see next section) she is likely to start pushing for immediate revision.

Meanwhile, Putin and the Russian government are also looking amenable to changes. The current deal has them providing gas to Ukraine at $95/1000cu m. This is not the direct price, but a product of playing with numbers in which Russia charges Ukraine a high (even by Western European standards) price of $230 but mixes in Turkmen gas at a nominal $50. Neither of the two combinatory prices is tenable, but the final price was a good deal for Ukraine, at first glance. Unfortunately, it later came out that the prices were only set through July, anyway.

That means that things were already highly questionable even before a new factor emerged: Turkmenistan is about to raise the rates it charges Russia. This will throw all the economic calculations in the current deal up in the air. Understandably, the Russian government is going to want to revise upward. Putin expressed interest in a new deal back when Turkmenistan was just mulling over the idea of raising rates. Now that it's official, he's pushing harder.

In fact, the only people nowadays who like the deal are the deputies in the Party of Regions. Listen to Yanukovych:

“This is an attempt to instigate anti-Russian mood in Ukraine and is an attempt by the government to cover up its incompetence,” Yanukovych said in an interview with Izvestia, a Russian daily, published Wednesday. “If the government moves to revise the agreement without any reason, tomorrow the entire Ukraine would rise against this [government].” [Ukrainian Journal]

And here I thought they were opposed to the deal. I mean they've only been denouncing it for months; they've only called (with Tymoshenko) for the Cabinet to be impeached because of it.

Talk about Janus-faced politicking. On the upside, this means PoR deputies must be pretty sure they're not going to be able to stop the new Orange coalition. Back when they had a chance at being in the Cabinet, they pretended to be incensed about the old deal in the expectation that they might need to sign off on a new one. Now, safe in the policy-making impotence of opposition, they've scuttled away from the fallout zone as fast as they can. I can hear the sanctimonious speeches about suffering Ukrainians already.

Whatever happens during negotiations, it is likely:

1. the new deal will substantially increase the price of gas to Ukraine, perhaps as high as $180/1000cu m
   
2. During negotiations, Russia is likely to make lower offers, which will be contingent upon Ukraine surrendering an unacceptable amount of control over its pipelines. It may actually manage to gain some control in the process.
   
3. this will be the end of RosUkrEnergo, the shady intermediary, thank goodness
4. drag on for quite some time

Unfortunately, I'm still not expecting the deal to get Ukraine and Turkmenistan working directly with one another, as might help both. As the spat drags on, it may even result in the same deadlock as last winter, with Russia "shutting off the tap" and Ukrainians skimming from European oil while Europe tries to figure out whom to blame. Meanwhile, PoR will be trying to convince Ukrainians that everything would have stayed just like it is now under their leadership.

Orange Cabinet Vote Today

Despite some of the news reporting, even from Yushchenko himself, the Orange Cabinet is still not a done deal. If it fails in a vote today, there is still the possibility that it will bring down the whole coalition with it. As Foreign Notes explains: 

The Orange coalitionists have confirmed that they will propose Yuliya Tymoshenko for PM, and Petro Poroshenko for parliamentary [VR] speaker. They have decided that voting will take place 'in a packet', i.e. the two positions to be voted for, openly and simultaneously.

...

Voting is supposed to be taking place tomorrow, but PR have been staging a 'sit-in' for the last two days, preventing the VR from functioning. They threaten to remain there until the VR is dissolved, and are demanding that the two posts are voted for separately by means of a secret vote. [So increasing the chances of bribed or otherwise 'nobbled*' orange deputies pressing the 'correct' button? For what other purpose would democratically elected representatives demand a secret vote?]

Kinakh and his party may try to play spoiler by voting against Poroshenko. Foreign Notes also mentions some speculation that RoU will try a massive bribery campaign to disrupt the vote. I suppose that's what this article from Ukrainska Pravda is trying to get at. Frankly I filed it under "WTF: someone please hire a real translator for these people".

Nonetheless, I expect to have at least some good news by tomorrow. If not about the coalition, then at least there's that chance against Italy in the World Cup game, right?