Mean Greater Voter Responsiveness

The results of the elections have been out since last Thursday. Most all of you have probably already seen them by now, but just so I have a breakdown on the site I've described them below. For more context, please take a look at the statistics (posted by a non-profit called Free Election) on the money spent on election campaigns (ukr) and subsection on advertising (ukr) to see what went into the long campaigns leading up to this election (hat tip: Neeka's Backlog)

The bottom line is that, in addition to having a largely free and fair election (a triumph in itself), Ukrainians have unloaded a lot of Parliamentary baggage. The Ne Tak'ers, Kuchma's old inner circle, are out. Lytvyn and his less central Kuchmaites are also out, as are all the other parties of convenience. Pora didn't make it (due to hazy goals and the unreliable nature of the "youth vote" I'd expect), but then neither did Vitrenko. Even the Communists barely made it in, continuing their precipitous slide into irrelevance.

These results are unlikely to be changed due to recounts still pending in certain regions (the most prominent from BYT). Most of the calls are from the >1% but <3% groups who would be thrilled to be able to scrabble past the 3% barrier and into Parliament any way they can (including Pora as well as Vitrenko, Lytvyn, and Viche). The only party with even a tiny chance is Vitrenko's bloc, since it was close at 2.93%, but I doubt they are going to find the "falsifications" they need.

One further preface note: I feel compelled to point out that back when the count was 50%, I thought RoU might pull up as high as 35% of the vote, based on lagging numbers from Eastern regions. It seems I exaggerated things, part of which was likely my underestimation of Tymoshenko's performance in Eastern Ukraine.

The percentage of votes won by all the blocs that made it into the Verkhovna Rada:

The number of seats taken by each bloc:

Most commentators have provided some of the following speculations on coalitions:

• NSNU-BYT Coalition: 210 deputies (not the 50% needed for passing most legislation)
• NSNU-BYT-Socialists / Orange Coalition: 243 deputies (comfortably over 50%)
• NSNU-RoU Coalition: 267 deputies (a commanding majority)
• BYT-RoU: 315 deputies (extremely unlikely)
• RoU-Socialists: 219 deputies (extremely unlikely and insufficient)
• RoU-Communists: 207 deputies (not the 50% needed for passing most legislation)

No Comfortable Allies

The problems with these allegiances are many. Getting NSNU and BYT together must be done over the vociferous infighting that has plagued their relationship since the Cabinet, with Tymoshenko as PM, was dismissed in September. More importantly, even together they will not have enough votes on their own, which means any coalition without Regions of Ukraine will require the Socialists to join in.

Moving along: RoU and the Communists would be unable to pass any policy on their own. BYT and the Socialists have repeatedly dismissed any possibility of a coalition with RoU. That leaves a possible NSNU-RoU coalition. There are a number of problems with this potential union as well. First among these problems is that it would be considered a betrayal by many of NSNU's remaining supporters, and the mere possibility of the union was enough to drive many former Orange Revolution supporters towards Tymoshenko in the election.

Orange Coalition Still Likely

The two easiest predictions about the coalition-building process are that it will be unpleasant for all blocs involved and will go on for a very long time. Acting PM Yekhanurov, in his usual blunt way, has predicted an Orange Coalition will be formed on the day before the two-month deadline (after which time Yushchenko has the power to dismiss the Parliament if no coalition has been formed). On Yekhanurov's timetable, this new coalition won't even choose a new PM until autumn, because time is needed in order to "calm down passions". I doubt things will progress nearly so slowly, as Yekhanurov will be the Acting PM while those passions are cooling, so it would be in his interest to predict and advocate for a long "calming" period.

So far the process has just begun. Yushchenko is meeting with both Yulia and Yanukovych and has said he will be keeping his options open. He's again made thinly veiled accusations against Tymoshenko, and the most recent agreement drafted with the Socialists hasn't satisfied them. Tymoshenko, in her turn, has said 20% of NSNU's leadership is considering joining with RoU, warning that they will go into opposition if this happens.

Despite the distaste NSNU and BYT have for one another, I expect them to join with the Socialists in a new Orange Coaltion before the deadline. On March 28, both NSNU and BYT predicted an orange coalition would be formed: Tymoshenko said one week and NSNU two weeks (though NSNU also invited RoU if it dropped some of its controversial agenda points). Ultimately, the former-Orange trio share the goal of "fighting corruption". Their support for this goal is weak, but it is still stronger than any other potentially unifying goal with Yanukovych. It is also enough to hold them together despite divisions over economic liberalism and other specific issues.

Economic Liberalism: I expect that one of the prices of coalition is likely to be anti-liberal legislation concessions to the Socialists. Socialist Leader Oleksandr Moroz is on record as saying trade liberalization needed to get into the WTO will "ruin the economy" when his party lined up with RoU to oppose the legislation last summer. The Socialists are guaranteed to try to extract unhelpful economic concessions in exchange for participating in a new Orange coalition because NSNU and BYT need them if they want a coalition without RoU.

BYT is unlikely to include many economic requirements in a coalition deal. Tymoshenko herself is more populist than anything else and in a recent FT interview (sub only - most favorable snippets on Tymoshenko's site) she seemed willing to take a more economically liberal line with businesses. However, she's still certain to push for renegotiation of the gas agreement with Russia.

The Natural Gas Agreement: NSNU and Yushchenko have come out in favor of the deal, but they are likely to have to give way to BYT over it. Tymoshenko's strong stance against the deal may have won her some of NSNU's supporters as clauses of the deal revealed throughout January and February made it seem less and less advantageous. As a result NSNU is unlikely to be able to hold up against her criticism without voter support behind them. Furthermore, Ukraine will theoretically need to renegotiate it by June anyway, because Turkmenistan is likely to raise its prices by then. The gas issue is a losing one for NSNU and even if they do not form a coalition with BYT, they're going to eventually need to scrap the deal as BYT has advocated.

No Solid Ties to Bind with RoU: Ultimately the election was a rebuke to NSNU and a commendation of BYT among their former Orange Revolution constituency. This came in response to Yushchenko's overtures towards Yanukovych as much as anything else, and it means that if his party is paying any attention to their base, they should be very reluctant to join with RoU. Furthermore, her lead on NSNU means Tymoshenko is entering the talks on a stronger footing.

The only way the RoU people could theoretically tempt NSNU away from an Orange Coalition would be based on either an "economic development" pitch or "cross-national unity" pitch. The former founders on the fact that RoU consistently opposed liberalization in 2005 (both the Krivoryzhstal privatization and WTO legislation). Perhaps RoU was just being obstructionist back then, and would be willing to get behind economic reforms in exchange for coalition membership. Yet it is unlikely that they are so fluid in their views to drop most of their economic stances, including ones directly in Mr. Akhmetov's interest.

The "unity" argument founders on the fact that unity itself cannot be a rallying point; blocs will only be able to unite around shared goals.

Politicians Fighting So Voters Don't Have To

While the eventual result is likely to be an Orange Coalition, the jostling, arguing, and horse-trading now will likely have a moderating effect on the activities of that coalition later. NSNU will likely be forced to give up its untenable defense of the gas agreement (though this may not happen until June). Tymoshenko is already starting to sound willing to compromise on economic issues. Akhmetov is trying to sneak into coalition with NSNU with a more moderated economic development platform than RoU had in 2005.

In short, politicians are going to have to swallow their disgust and make necessary but odious political compromises. Not incidentally, these compromises should help, or at least reflect the views of, most Ukrainian citizens.