Yushchenko asserts himself!

Yushchenko has, hold onto your hats, asserted his authority a couple times recently. First in attempting to override the PoR attempt to fire his presidentially-appointed Foreign Minister (still uncertain if he'll be able to hold on: see this bit of cheekery from Yanukovych).

Then Yushchenko vetoed the PoR-sponsored budget, for the avowed reason that it included insufficient social spending. PoR deputies countered that the social spending Yushchenko is asking for would cost UAH 10bn ($2bn), but were unable to overcome the veto. Tymoshenko's prediction was that, rather than struggle to compromise, PoR would be willing to sit around and wait for a lack-of-budget crisis, continue to throw up new budget drafts nearly the same as the old, let Yushchenko veto them, and then blame him for the budget crisis that emerges.

I'm inclined to believe her view: the only true change in the second draft has been a limit on maximum pensions; potential social spending increases have all be couched in weasel words that render them non-promises. (Channel 5)

Poroshenko and Co. Out Of Leadership In An Open Vote 

Yushchenko also seems to have conducted a serious party reorganization, sidelining Poroshenko and many of the other big businessmen in the party. Strangely, to me, a number of Ukrainian news sources have criticized this move. Zerkalo Nedeli has questioned where the party will get its money if its big business backers are sidelined, to which I would respond, where is it supposed to get its votes if it continues to align with the goals of the business moguls?

They also worried about the leadership change being "undemocratic" because Yushchenko didn't keep the results secret. For goodness sake, secret ballots are what got them into this mess. You look at Eurasia Daily Monitor a year ago, you see Yushchenko's party unsuccessful at sidelining Poroshenko despite the fact that he was a clear and obvious political liability. Secrecy is important in national elections so the party in power can't exert influence. On the other hand, once elected, deputies should do a lot of open voting: how else are voters to have any idea whether they agree with the deputies' views?

Even more basic: NSNU is so far in the hole, I can't see why these news sources would be against a reorganizing. That's what losing parties are supposed to do.

This is not to say that new appointee Khoroshkovskiy is less of a big business figure, but he is new, and the old wasn't working.

Looking to Throw Good Votes After Bad

On the other hand, Eurasia Daily Monitor mentions speculation that the reason for this whole reorganization is an attempt to make the party more attractive to voters ahead of a spring parliamentary election.

"Wait," you might say, "I don't remember any spring election."

You are correct: there is none. But Bloc Yuliya Tymoshenko and Nasha Ukrayina are hoping to have Yushchenko scuttle the current parliament and hold them, impromptu. For some fool reason they think they will be able to win back some of the votes lost to PoR by disrupting Ukrainians' lives with another election.

This is like a gambler letting the mortgage ride on a poker hand because he needs to "make up his losses". If the election goes ahead, all the politicians in parliament will blame the clear economic and political disaster that will arise on the other side and people will end up voting for the same damn folks as last time, with the addition that they'll be extra pissed at NSNU and BYT for fomenting all the chaos. To be honest, if the parties succeed, they'll deserve what they get. Yushchenko should know that he will need to push hard to get the country into the WTO by spring, and if he wastes his time on this fool's proposition, chances will drop to zero. Tymoshenko, meanwhile would better spend her time doing something merely useless, like trying to skewer politicians in power for higher gas prices.

Zerkalo Nedeli has, thank goodness, covered this issue a lot better than it did the NSNU power reshuffle. According to their estimations, the reasonable money is that if Yushchenko and Tymoshenko make this move, everything's going to ride on a Constitutional Court decision. About which they have this to say:

In reality, the Constitutional Court is neither a heartless automaton nor a slave colony. It is a collective of people with the same human drawbacks as most others have. Firstly, their professional knowledge and aptness of thinking are rather questionable, judging from their career backgrounds. But even proficiency in formal jurisprudence is not always enough for constitutional arbitration.

Secondly, only two of twelve CC judges have ever been associated with constitutional processes. To the remaining ten, the Constitution is like a neighbor’s baby they have to look after. At least half of the CC judges regard both versions of the Constitution as far from perfect and believe that they could write a perfect organic law. They may be right, but there are no empirical proofs of their objectivity.

...

In fact, it doesn't matter much whether it is true that Tymoshenko is negotiating a deal with Medvedchuk, that Medvedchuk is trading his “services” to Yanukovych for the post of vice premier, or that Klyuyev is “working” on CC judges. The judges are independent enough (financially and politically) to defy any forecasts. Their first verdict will show whether a preterm election is possible and whether the Law can ever rule this country.

Ten judges looking after the constitution like a neighbor's baby: that's a metaphor to take home with you.

But, still, what an opportunity: A court with some independence. Political forces balancing each other out around them. Heavily underqualified justices, yes, but they'll be in a position to make a real and important decision. Considering how many of Ukraine's woes are tied to the crippling weakness of the judiciary, if they do end up deciding this case, it may be a big step forward.