Orange Ukraine - Journal of Ukrainian Current Events

I make the case that it won't ultimately help Yanukovych

The gas conflict with Russia continues to broil on. Now the winter break is here and, as the situation stands, Ukrainians could be looking forward to having their gas cut off this New Year's. Which would be a very bad sign to all those out there who believe the old Ukrainian superstition that the way you begin a year is the way the whole year will progress.

Tymoshenko has weighed in now to say that, in the likely event that the government does not reach an agreement with Russia by January 1, the Cabinet should resign. This is some pretty mean-spirited political positioning ahead of the March election, and I am disappointed to see Tymoshenko using it (as Zerkalo Nedeli was before me). I seem to recall her playing a major role in fomenting a gas conflict in July. Then she was the populist PM working for Ukrainian voters by trying to impose price caps on evil Russian businesses trying to charge Ukraine "unfair" prices. Yushchenko had to come in then and rebuked her for her obviously economically-unsound policy. He then put the prices back at market levels and the problem went away.

Now that she's in the opposition, though, it is not the Russian government's but the Ukrainian government's fault that prices are going up. For shame!

Grinding On

Zerkalo Nedeli recently came out with a great analysis of this situation, translated into English (including a criticism of Tymoshenko). I like how they dish out the blame to all participants.

To Russia:

It is naive to think that Russia’s move is aimed exclusively at patching the hole in its coffers. Vice Prime Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov said, “In my opinion, sometimes we don’t formulate our policy in relation to different CIS countries clearly enough. And we act too irresolutely when it comes to our economic influence on those countries’ attitudes to Russia.” According to ZN’s information, Lavrov promised at a closed-door session of the Duma to employ “all available means of economic pressure” on the “disobedient” neighbors. Natural gas and oil, which the Kremlin justly views on par with nuclear arms, is supposed to be the main diplomatic means.

To Yushchenko:

Now, where is Yushchenko’s party Our Ukraine? Why is it still silent? Are the national democratic forces following their leader’s advice “not to politicize the negotiating process?” That is a very good screen for certain “friends” of his, who make money on shady deals with Russian businessmen. The gas deadlock is also another opportunity for them to “drown” Tymoshenko. The impending doom does not seem to worry them much.

To Tymoshenko:

Roman Bezsmertniy, campaign chief of staff for Yushchenko’s election bloc, says that Tymoshenko’s demand to sack the government unless it signs a contract with Russian natural gas suppliers by January 1 is a stab in the back. He is absolutely right and his patriotic statement demonstrates very clearly which Tymoshenko is more concerned about: her problems with Russian prosecutors or her country’s national security.

To Yanukovych:

The Party of Regions demonstrates utter near-sightedness. Supposing Ukraine fails in the negotiations and the price for Russian natural gas goes up fivefold. This defeat may be fatal for Yushchenko: the critical mass of his errors will drag his team to the bottom in the parliamentary race. Subsequently, Yanukovych and Akhmetov will win, securing a majority in the future parliament, which entitles them to form a government. But the economic impact from the gas price rise will crush their government in a mere six months. Besides, the Party of Regions represents the interests of big financial-industrial groups and its electorate is concentrated in the heavily industrialized regions of the country, which will suffer from these price hikes more than others. In view of such prospects, it would be logical to help the government stand its ground in negotiations with Russia. It is in their interests to secure the terms of the new gas supply contract, under which their chemical and metallurgical plants would profit. But do they move a finger? No. Obsessed by their mania for power, they are ready to victimize thousands of people employed at their factories, not to mention the entire country.

Blame dished out to all, and fairly, I might add.

Guessing About the Public Opinion Response

I haven't gotten any really good public opinion numbers yet. I'm very curious to see whether or not the strong-arm tactics by Russia will work. Will Ukrainians respond more sympathetically to the Russia government's argument (that this is a purely economic move, and that the Ukrainian government is being obstructionist) or to the Ukrainian government's argument (that the Russian government has hiked the price unreasonably quickly, and this is part of an attempt to damage Ukrainian politicians it doesn't like ahead of the Ukrainian election).

ZN seems to think Ukrainians might side with the Russian government, or they would not have worded their condemnation of Yanukovych in that way. Even so, I'm going to go out on a limb and predict that pro-Russian candidates (Regions of Ukraine and the Communists) will do less well with the oil crisis than they would have done without.

Of course they're still going to have a good showing, even in the rerun in 2004 Yanu got 40%, but this escalation of antagonism won't help. Please hold me to this prediction, I will try to make reference to it after the election is over.

Why do I think this confilct will turn Ukrainian opinion against Russia? Four reasons:

When was the last time threats of dire economic reprisals from Russia began circulating? During the Orange Revolution. It didn't work then.
Yushchenko's popularity, and that of his party, has fallen precipitously since the last election, but if there's one thing that revives the popularity of a politician, it's a threat from outside. I just can't believe that, should Russian Gazprom flick the switch on the nation in the middle of New Year's celebrations, Ukrainians will ultimately feel sympathetic to Gazprom's reasoning.
Tied in with the last point, I think the rising antagonism from Russian citizens towards Ukraine (they very clearly see this problem as Ukraine's doing) will not help gain Ukrainian support. It will be easier for Ukrainian citizens to feel confrontational and antagonistic if they think Russians are behaving similarly, and this budding antagonism will partly displace their frustration with their own government.
Tymoshenko got herself a little ratings boost with her blatantly anti-market attempts to fix low oil prices in July. Ukrainians, as with voters in much of the world, are not particularly altruistic about supporting solid free-market economic policy that hurts their interests (for the most part, the price hike proposed by Gazprom would bring prices charged to Ukraine up even with those charged to Western Europe, not single Ukraine out for unusually high prices).

Ultimately, above any of the previous items, I think Ukraine will respond negatively to Russia as a result of this crisis because the Russian government has underestimated the strength of national identity in Ukraine. I am especially confirmed in this belief because many commentators have underestimate Ukrainian national ideantity, and I am one of them. I underestimated Ukraine just before the Orange Revolution. I came back from observing the election with the OSCE with my wife, and we both thought that the nation would just muddle along. Instead, Ukrainians showed us an amazing amount of dedication to their nation and democratic principles. I'd never heard such nationalism under Kuchma, just like I'd never heard the national anthem sung with such enthusiasm.

That is why I expect that the strength of Ukrainian affiliation to national identity will prompt them to take the side of their own government (despite their misgivings) rather than take the side of a foreign nation against their own.