From the (admittedly very quick brushstrokes) portrait in the last posting, I hope I've portrayed Yushchenko as best I understand him: a hesitant, but principled economic man.
He was an accountant in Soviet times, and he is still an accountant/banker personality. He is the battle cry of the opposition, but, ironically, Timoshenko seems to get the crowd going more by crying his name than he does in his speeches. His debate with Yanukovych was a catalogue of insightful economic arguments on his side, and disconnected non-arguments on Yanukovych's part. Yushchenko is no extremist. How about Yanukovych?
Last time I talked about how Yushchenko's rational economics are not anti-Russian. So can I argue that Yanukovych is also not as anti-US as he is made out to be? Yes I can, for one big reason.
What is the biggest thing in US politics? Iraq, of course. Now I do NOT want to get in a US political argument, but suffice to say: it is fairly widely agreed that the US needs all the troops it can get, and as wide an international coalition of the willing as possible if it is to accomplish something there.
But one of Yushchenko's central campaign promises is to pull all Ukrainian troops out of Iraq. He is doing so to please voters. The vast majority of Ukrainians (around 80%) want their troops out and think sending them there was just a play by Kuchma to get back on the US's good side after the US accused Ukraine of selling missile defense systems to Saddam. Yanukovych has promised to reduce the number of troops, but very clearly not to pull them out entirely.
On the central US foreign policy issue of the present day, Yanukovych is more pro-US than Yushchenko. This is only one issue, yes, but it is a very big issue. If the US were only pursuing realpolitik gains, it would something significant to gain (or at least not to lose) from the Yanukovych presidency as well as a Yushchenko one. Perhaps, just perhaps, the US really does care more about the democratic process than about cheap and transitory foreign policy victories.
Relations with the Russian Government
There are a few things that make Yanukovych more attractive to Russians: They include the two theoretical proclivities I talked about in the last posting, one for the Brody-Odesa plan, the other for the CEA. The other advantages he has for the Russians are: his campaign promises to promote dual Russian-Ukrainian citizenship, promote Russian as a second language in Ukraine, and suggestions of reduced efforts to get Ukraine into NATO.
But integrating Russia and Ukraine to the point where dual-citizenship is possible is a very large project, with many, as yet undiscussed, intermediary steps required. What might those steps look like?
For an answer, I refer back to the CEA. In the CEA summits that have already occurred, the Russian government has consistently sought the creation of strong economic ties involving linked economic policy with votes on policy calculated by economic strength and population. Ukraine (and Kazakhstan), on the other hand, would rather have a non-invasive free-trade zone that would give it greater access to big, populous Russian markets without allowing the Russians to interfere in its economic policy. Most experts also think the strong-Russian CEA would derail Ukrainian aspirations to membership the WTO and NATO (too little control to exert proper financial discipline and open trade policy, among other worries). Little progress has thus been made on the CEA because of this divide.
The same is what should be expected from dual citizenship. Ukrainians would want no-strings-attached free access to Russia, but there's no reason for the Russian government to go for that. Going on past behavior, the Russian government will require prohibitively tight integration in which the Russian government can disproportionately guide activities for both countries. Without details, Yanukovych's campaign pledge is merely campaign rhetoric.
The Russian language issue in Ukraine is another sore point. A language that many (perhaps most) Ukrainians speak by preference, and almost all are able to speak, should theoretically be a legitimate second national language. Without getting into too many details, this is also merely campaign trail promises.
To put things in perspective, this issue is not one that inspires heat from the Ukrainians I meet. There is no Russian-speaking underclass. Beware the reporters that hint otherwise, because they are trying to distort facts. Ukrainians speak whatever language they prefer, and recognize that government agencies use Ukrainian. They get mildly annoyed that their children are taught Ukrainian in school if they prefer Russian, but the ONE person I've seen get really angry about this was a politically active AMERICAN. In THREE years.
And since when has Yushchenko cracked down on the use of the Russian language? He is an economic man. If Ukrainians got up in arms about using more Russian (they have not) he would follow their will the same way he has on Iraq: language is not his issue.
Concluding Speculation: So what's wrong with campaign promises?
Absolutely nothing. Yanukovych is free to make all the promises he wants. But here's the key point: questionable campaign promises should not have attracted the Russian government as strongly as they did. The Russian government should not be so partisan for Yanukovych. Please see my posting for a breakdown on how partisan it has been. Millions into his campaign fund. Putin dropping by like Ukraine's his weekend getaway. Yushchenko is not so far behind Yanukovych in his rhetoric, and from his past behavior, his actions follow his rhetoric. Why does the Russian government love Yanukovych so much?
Because they are for style over substance. Yanukovych's style of suppressing the media and the opposition, his disconnect from economic policy relative to power politics, even his very unpopularity in western and central Ukraine is "safer" to the Russian government. The Russian government prefers Yanukovych because he is an illiberal strongman, like it preferred Shevardnadze and supports Lukashenko. Economically-rational and democratic countries will turn to the west because that's where the money and stable democracy is. This is basic self-interest, not a massive propaganda drive by the West against Russia. The Russian government prefers Ukraine to be ruled by a strongman, the more illiberal the better, because it is illiberal and the vast majority of its people poor and oppressed, and each friend that becomes otherwise is a friend it eventually loses touch with, and a dangerous example to ordinary Russians.
That is what is ultimately meant when it is said that Yanukovych is the "Eastern" candidate and Yushchenko the "Western" one. Eastern here means illiberal, economically irrational, and against the interests of ordinary Ukrainians. Ukraine should choose rational economics, improved democracy, and its leaders should act in the people's best interest. Calling that "Western" is a misnomer.