Mean Greater Voter Responsiveness

The results of the elections have been out since last Thursday. Most all of you have probably already seen them by now, but just so I have a breakdown on the site I've described them below. For more context, please take a look at the statistics (posted by a non-profit called Free Election) on the money spent on election campaigns (ukr) and subsection on advertising (ukr) to see what went into the long campaigns leading up to this election (hat tip: Neeka's Backlog)

The bottom line is that, in addition to having a largely free and fair election (a triumph in itself), Ukrainians have unloaded a lot of Parliamentary baggage. The Ne Tak'ers, Kuchma's old inner circle, are out. Lytvyn and his less central Kuchmaites are also out, as are all the other parties of convenience. Pora didn't make it (due to hazy goals and the unreliable nature of the "youth vote" I'd expect), but then neither did Vitrenko. Even the Communists barely made it in, continuing their precipitous slide into irrelevance.

These results are unlikely to be changed due to recounts still pending in certain regions (the most prominent from BYT). Most of the calls are from the >1% but <3% groups who would be thrilled to be able to scrabble past the 3% barrier and into Parliament any way they can (including Pora as well as Vitrenko, Lytvyn, and Viche). The only party with even a tiny chance is Vitrenko's bloc, since it was close at 2.93%, but I doubt they are going to find the "falsifications" they need.

One further preface note: I feel compelled to point out that back when the count was 50%, I thought RoU might pull up as high as 35% of the vote, based on lagging numbers from Eastern regions. It seems I exaggerated things, part of which was likely my underestimation of Tymoshenko's performance in Eastern Ukraine.

The percentage of votes won by all the blocs that made it into the Verkhovna Rada:

The number of seats taken by each bloc:

Most commentators have provided some of the following speculations on coalitions:

• NSNU-BYT Coalition: 210 deputies (not the 50% needed for passing most legislation)
• NSNU-BYT-Socialists / Orange Coalition: 243 deputies (comfortably over 50%)
• NSNU-RoU Coalition: 267 deputies (a commanding majority)
• BYT-RoU: 315 deputies (extremely unlikely)
• RoU-Socialists: 219 deputies (extremely unlikely and insufficient)
• RoU-Communists: 207 deputies (not the 50% needed for passing most legislation)

No Comfortable Allies

The problems with these allegiances are many. Getting NSNU and BYT together must be done over the vociferous infighting that has plagued their relationship since the Cabinet, with Tymoshenko as PM, was dismissed in September. More importantly, even together they will not have enough votes on their own, which means any coalition without Regions of Ukraine will require the Socialists to join in.

Moving along: RoU and the Communists would be unable to pass any policy on their own. BYT and the Socialists have repeatedly dismissed any possibility of a coalition with RoU. That leaves a possible NSNU-RoU coalition. There are a number of problems with this potential union as well. First among these problems is that it would be considered a betrayal by many of NSNU's remaining supporters, and the mere possibility of the union was enough to drive many former Orange Revolution supporters towards Tymoshenko in the election.

Orange Coalition Still Likely

The two easiest predictions about the coalition-building process are that it will be unpleasant for all blocs involved and will go on for a very long time. Acting PM Yekhanurov, in his usual blunt way, has predicted an Orange Coalition will be formed on the day before the two-month deadline (after which time Yushchenko has the power to dismiss the Parliament if no coalition has been formed). On Yekhanurov's timetable, this new coalition won't even choose a new PM until autumn, because time is needed in order to "calm down passions". I doubt things will progress nearly so slowly, as Yekhanurov will be the Acting PM while those passions are cooling, so it would be in his interest to predict and advocate for a long "calming" period.

So far the process has just begun. Yushchenko is meeting with both Yulia and Yanukovych and has said he will be keeping his options open. He's again made thinly veiled accusations against Tymoshenko, and the most recent agreement drafted with the Socialists hasn't satisfied them. Tymoshenko, in her turn, has said 20% of NSNU's leadership is considering joining with RoU, warning that they will go into opposition if this happens.

Despite the distaste NSNU and BYT have for one another, I expect them to join with the Socialists in a new Orange Coaltion before the deadline. On March 28, both NSNU and BYT predicted an orange coalition would be formed: Tymoshenko said one week and NSNU two weeks (though NSNU also invited RoU if it dropped some of its controversial agenda points). Ultimately, the former-Orange trio share the goal of "fighting corruption". Their support for this goal is weak, but it is still stronger than any other potentially unifying goal with Yanukovych. It is also enough to hold them together despite divisions over economic liberalism and other specific issues.

Economic Liberalism: I expect that one of the prices of coalition is likely to be anti-liberal legislation concessions to the Socialists. Socialist Leader Oleksandr Moroz is on record as saying trade liberalization needed to get into the WTO will "ruin the economy" when his party lined up with RoU to oppose the legislation last summer. The Socialists are guaranteed to try to extract unhelpful economic concessions in exchange for participating in a new Orange coalition because NSNU and BYT need them if they want a coalition without RoU.

BYT is unlikely to include many economic requirements in a coalition deal. Tymoshenko herself is more populist than anything else and in a recent FT interview (sub only - most favorable snippets on Tymoshenko's site) she seemed willing to take a more economically liberal line with businesses. However, she's still certain to push for renegotiation of the gas agreement with Russia.

The Natural Gas Agreement: NSNU and Yushchenko have come out in favor of the deal, but they are likely to have to give way to BYT over it. Tymoshenko's strong stance against the deal may have won her some of NSNU's supporters as clauses of the deal revealed throughout January and February made it seem less and less advantageous. As a result NSNU is unlikely to be able to hold up against her criticism without voter support behind them. Furthermore, Ukraine will theoretically need to renegotiate it by June anyway, because Turkmenistan is likely to raise its prices by then. The gas issue is a losing one for NSNU and even if they do not form a coalition with BYT, they're going to eventually need to scrap the deal as BYT has advocated.

No Solid Ties to Bind with RoU: Ultimately the election was a rebuke to NSNU and a commendation of BYT among their former Orange Revolution constituency. This came in response to Yushchenko's overtures towards Yanukovych as much as anything else, and it means that if his party is paying any attention to their base, they should be very reluctant to join with RoU. Furthermore, her lead on NSNU means Tymoshenko is entering the talks on a stronger footing.

The only way the RoU people could theoretically tempt NSNU away from an Orange Coalition would be based on either an "economic development" pitch or "cross-national unity" pitch. The former founders on the fact that RoU consistently opposed liberalization in 2005 (both the Krivoryzhstal privatization and WTO legislation). Perhaps RoU was just being obstructionist back then, and would be willing to get behind economic reforms in exchange for coalition membership. Yet it is unlikely that they are so fluid in their views to drop most of their economic stances, including ones directly in Mr. Akhmetov's interest.

The "unity" argument founders on the fact that unity itself cannot be a rallying point; blocs will only be able to unite around shared goals.

Politicians Fighting So Voters Don't Have To

While the eventual result is likely to be an Orange Coalition, the jostling, arguing, and horse-trading now will likely have a moderating effect on the activities of that coalition later. NSNU will likely be forced to give up its untenable defense of the gas agreement (though this may not happen until June). Tymoshenko is already starting to sound willing to compromise on economic issues. Akhmetov is trying to sneak into coalition with NSNU with a more moderated economic development platform than RoU had in 2005.

In short, politicians are going to have to swallow their disgust and make necessary but odious political compromises. Not incidentally, these compromises should help, or at least reflect the views of, most Ukrainian citizens.

Good News 

The OSCE has posted up its preliminary findings on the election.

Their main conclusion:

The 26 March parliamentary elections were conducted basically in line with OSCE Commitments, Council of Europe commitments and other international standards for democratic elections. Overall, fundamental civil and political rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly, were respected. An inclusive candidate registration and a vibrant media environment provided for genuine competition and equal conditions. This enabled voters to make informed choices between distinct alternatives and to freelyand fairly express their will.

Though they go on to mention a number of shortcomings in with the positive signs: delayed opening time at some polling stations, no Constitutional Court now in office, poorly defined campaign finance legislation, many polling stations with too many registered voters - contributing to long lines, authorities underestimated the scale of their task.

On the plus side again, they found that inaccuracies in the voting lists submitted t othem were isolated. This is good news considering the worrying translation of some Russian last names into Ukrainian which might have disenfranchised many Eastern Ukrainians if it were widespread.

not fully reflected in the numbers yet

I've had a few visitors to the site get mislead by the current polling numbers, so I wanted to write a quick corrective entry here. According to the Ukraine-wide vote count of 50% of votes, RoU has 27% and Tymoshenko 23%. However, this number is misleading.

A more informed number would take into account the percentage of votes which have been counted by region. (Sorry, they don't have links directly to the page - in Ukrainian it's fourth group, third item along the left side menubar. I found the English version hard to understand.) The important detail here is that the percentage of votes that have been counted in pro-Tymoshenko areas is consistently 20% higher than those counted in pro-RoU areas (60% to 40%) everywhere except Kyiv. This means that as those numbers reach parity, Tymoshenko is going to fall behind and Yanukovych is going to pull ahead considerably.

Luhansk is particularly far behind, at only 35% counted. Donetsk is at 41%, and Volinsk, where Yulia has had a strong showing, is at 62%.

So expect RoU to pull up considerably, maybe over 35% by the end of voting. This might mean results a lot closer to a 50-50 split than I think the polls predicted. It would also make for a lot more hung-Parliament votes.

Also worth mentioning that Tymoshenko is doing much better than NSNU relative to the pre-election predictions. This argues that, as Foreign Notes and others have mentioned, her campaign was much more effective and understandable to Ukrainian voters. I would also consider it a repudiation by the Orange areas of the country of NSNU's waffling on 1) whether they might join in coalition with Yanukovych, 2) willingness to crack down on corruption, 3) maybe the oil crisis with Russia and the merits of their January 4 deal (though this may have only been significant to wonky types like, erhem, me).

[update: Read WRY's extremely detailed and frequent updates in the comments below for a long list of numbers updates.]

But no sign of major violations yet

The most important thing needed in this election, that it be free and fair, seems to have happened.

The CVU has so far found long lines at the polls the most significant impediment to Ukrainians exercising their right to vote. They say the polls opened without major incident, and mentioned a few generally minor problems: overstuffed boxes, a drunken polling station commission leader. Please do check out their site. There were a couple more troublesome problems in some regions: accusations of ballot stuffing and carousel voting.

No new press releases from the OSCE that I can find. I don't expect their preliminary report on the election for a few days.

The CIS election monitors criticized the continued presence of some NSNU campaign posters during the voting. (a picture of one such posteris on Neeka's Backlog) The posters are quite annoying and unfair, and should be criticized. But as with a couple drunk commission heads, it's still small beer. I can't find anything more than that from this CIS Belarus website, and don't know where else I might find it. They may be reserving further comment until later, like the OSCE.

In any case, don't set too much stock in their accusations. Their election observation mission revealed its lack of credibility when it called Yanukovych's stolen Nov 2004 vote "transparent, legal, and free," and did the same for both the 2006 and 2004 elections in Belarus. It's nice to have them around to scout out any problems they can find, but don't pay attention to their conclusions.

Expect the Bulk of the Results to Start Coming in by 3AM Ukraine Time 

Check in with the Central Election Commission for the latest results of the actual vote count. It will still be quite a while before the results are likely to get in because the polls only closed at 10pm (an admirable extension of two hours beyond the time they closed during the presidential election, certainly for the purpose of giving people to fill out enormous ballots; some heroic poll station commissions waited even longer). From what I saw with the OSCE in 2004, when the polls closed at 8pm it took until one or two AM to finish the vote count. Expect the counting to remain incomplete until around three or even four, then, (at a minimum, considering the ballots this time are much larger), then another hour or so for the regional election centers to gather up the results from individual polling stations and announce them.

That means 6am Ukrainian time, more or less. Who knows how long it will take the CEC to give the official nation-wide vote count.

Until those votes come out, you can take a look at Neeka's Backlog (Ah, the indispensable Neeka), where she has posted up some of the exit poll numbers.

All my congratulations to those Ukrainian voters who waited through the long lines at the polls to vote on Sunday. Lesya's 89-year-old grandpa Volodya and a number of other older citizens of his town were all picked up by horse-drawn cart and taken off to voting locations. (perhaps there was a shortage of mobile boxes)

I just wanted to use this whole post to congratuate you all.
 

"Hand Against All" is the least instructive vote you can cast

Before it gets any closer to election day, I wanted to say one thing to all Ukrainians voters and all English-speakers who might pass on the words to their Ukrainian friends.

Vote for anyone, anyone, in this election, rather than vote "Against All". Why? Because voting is your one best chance to send messages to your government; why squander that chance on the shortest, least informative message possible?

You say, "I don't like any of the candidates, and I want them to know I think they're all corrupt and useless." Then you should read my favorite posting this year over at Neeka's Backlog, in which she passes along these words of wisdom from political analyst Les' Poderevyansky:

...It'd be immature of us to say: "We aren't going to vote because both these guys and those guys are full of shit." We have to distinguish between shit of various degrees of nobility - elephant shit and hyena shit, for example. And we should go and vote for elephant shit because an elephant is a more noble animal and it doesn't stink as much.

In other countries, politicians aren't made of honey, either. And moreover, this is nothing unusual for us - here, the noblest citizens have been getting snuffed out for centuries.

Voting is participation in politics, and politics is a mucky business, but that's no reason to avoid decisionmaking.

Process of Elimination 

There are a lot of criminals in this election. I know it. You know it. And they know it. The politicians know you don't like them. Do you think Kuchma didn't know he was unpopular? Not only that, when his popularity dropped into single digits after the Gongadze protests, he knew he had to change because of the drop in popularity. Before that time, he was more popular than the Verkhovna Rada, so he would often threaten the VR with national referendums. Afterwards, he didn't have that tool anymore.

And Kuchma was unaccountable, corrupt, and extremely powerful. By contrast: do you think Yushchenko, who owes his position to the incredible efforts of voters robbed of their rights, can't be instructed by a vote? Do you think Yanukovych, who tried to circumvent the voting system and lost, doesn't appreciate the importance of the vote now?

If politicians (the world over) don't know by now that people dislike them, no vote will be able to convince them of that fact. The job of voters everywhere, but especially in Ukraine, is to distinguish the awful from the even more awful, and then vote for the least bad. When left-leaning French citizens came to a vote in which they were give a choice between  a xenophobic ultra-rightist, and reelecting an unliked rightist they put on plastic gloves, closed off their noses with laundry pins, and cast their votes for the less-bad candidate. As Ukrainians, you have had to make an equally unattractive choice, between Kuchma or Communism, so I know you can do it.

I Do Mean Any Candidate

This last week the Kyiv Post gave its endorsement to Pora, for reasons similar to ones I brought up in an entry in January. Though I haven't been terribly impressed by their campaign work, and I still think they have the vision problem of a newly formed party I talked about last spring, I would definitely be happy to see them break the 3% barrier.

Of course you are at Orange Ukraine, so as you'd expect I'd love to see NSNU and BYT have a good showing. But that doesn't matter. If you honestly believe Regions of Ukraine, including Akhmetov and his top twelve managers, are a hair less corrupt than NSNU with Poroshenko, Yulia the "Gas Princess" and her party, and the other Orange parties: vote for them. God help us all, if you think the Communists are the least bad candidates, and you know how much I hate communism, vote for them.

Just don't vote "Against All" and give the politicians a message they can forget. Don't send them a message that will leave no candidates around to keep reminding them of your 2006 opinion until 2011.

Yushchenko's Parliament Dissolver

For those Orange Ukraine readers who don't know, Yushchenko legally has the ability to dissolve Parliament if a majority faction cannot be formed and a PM not chosen within a set timeframe after the March election. Furthermore, RIA Novosti, not my best source, now has him as saying he may use that ability. I don't see this as a strong threat, but considering some of Yushchenko's policies in the past, I consider it enough of a possiblity to mention in this space.

You'd Have to be MAD

To me the exercise of this right would be the political equivalent of an atom bomb. It would annihilate the current form of government down to the tiniest pieces, and after that it would be anybody's guess what the new government would look like. No politician in the majority non-NSNU Parliament that is sure to arise after the election would agree to any new reformation of the government amenable to NSNU.The result would be chaotic and would leave the nation with essentially no government for months. No sane businessperson would want to work in this environment unless he was expecting to make illicit gains. The political risk in the country would go off the charts, so say goodbye to FDI.Heaven help Ukrainians if it occurs.

I cannot stress enough how bad an idea this would be. Yushchenko should be ashamed for even threatening to use it. Why would he do this?

Poor Posture

In trying to explain this move to myself: I toss this in with the rest of NSNU's contradictory statements about whether it would consider joining in coalition with Yanukovych, or get back together with Tymoshenko after the election.

The Eurasia Daily Monitor is uncertain, citing Yushchenko's statement that the question of whether or not his bloc might form a coalition with Regions of Ukraine cannot be answered until after the election (ForUm has him down as saying Orange forces shouldn't discuss any positions before the election). On the other hand, Roman Zvarych has now dismissed the idea of forming a coalition with Yanukovych categorically and claims there is a secret tally that he thinks will get them the minimum needed Orange coalition.

Roman Bessmirtniy, according to EDM, has joined with Zvarych in stating his assurance that NSNU will join in coaltion with Tymoshenko. Funny, a little over a month ago he was accusing Tymoshenko of using Hitler-like methods to gain support, but now he's ready to join up with her. As I've said at least a thousands times: can NSNU get rid of this waste of a deputy seat, please?

It's no wonder Bessmirtniy is on the blacklist of people in NSNU that Tymoshenko says her bloc would be unwilling to join in coalition with. (though how she would expect NSNU to selectively exclude a small handful of deputies in its own party, I have no idea.) At least on the topic of whether or not she would ever join in coalition with Yanukovych she's clear: no, opposition would be better, and shame on you for even considering it, NSNU.

It's clear to me that Yushchenko's party is trying to revile Tymoshenko and her party as much as possible, knowing that their efforts repulse very few former Orange supporters so much that they will vote for Yanukovych (a good point in this rather astoundingly optimistic article). Therefore NSNU concentrates its fire on Tymoshenko, despite knowing they will have to join in coalition with her after the election, to try to win over some of her votes and become the strong party in the coaltion.

If NSNU does manage to come out significantly ahead, its deputies will be able to argue from strength that Yekhanurov should remain PM and Tymoshenko should only get a secondary ministry position. As a consequence of this infighting strategy, they hardly take a shot at the oligarch-crammed Regions of Ukraine.

As best I can tell, this (foolishly short-sighted) strategy is accompanied by the threat of dissolving the Parliament to get Tymoshenko to back off her efforts to become Prime Minister. This isn't my most solid theory ever (it relies on NSNU having such a poisonous hatred of Tymoshenko they would reject all reasonable debate), so if any of you have a better one, I would be thrilled to hear it.

In other news...

Voter List Problems

The Moscow Times has an interesting article stating that many Ukrainians with Russian last names have had their last names converted to the Ukrainian equivalents on the election rolls. The reason for this deplorable change, however, is less clear. They quote a NSNU spokeswoman as saying "Commission officials could not be reached for comment. But Tatyana Makridi,
a spokeswoman for the ruling bloc, Our Ukraine, said regional and local administrations in the eastern and southern regions were responsible for the voters' rolls and any mistakes on them," and Taras Chernovil as saying it's all part of a plot to disenfranchise Eastern Ukrainians.

The CVU responded with what they've said elsewhere, which is that the election rolls in general (as always seems the case) are a complete mess right before the election(Ukr). Yes, the authorities have called on voters to check their names in the rosters before the election, but that hardly substitutes for getting the books straight in advance. I, for one, would have thought that there would have been more progress in getting the voting rolls in order after having three rounds of elections in 2004 in which many many voters lodged complaints or changed their information.

For whatever reason, it looks like poorly kept voter rolls will again be a significant impediment to people exercising their rights to vote. One of the positive developments in both the second and third rounds of the 2004 elections was that the exactness with which a person's passport name must match the name on the books was relaxed, which helped at least get over people being refused for minor misspellings. Hopefully the system will be sufficiently accomodating in this regard this time around, too.

Watch for the translations of names in specific, though, because it is a particularly biased form of poor recordkeeping. May it be an isolated problem.

Transdniester Backtracking

So the YuGov is celebrating because the Transdiester authorities have lifted their embargo. (that's right, Transdniester's embargo, don't believe the crowing from Russia and the statelet that Ukraine was the one shutting down the border: what Ukraine actually did at the beginning of the month was allow Moldovan customs inspectors to inspect goods exiting the statelet, while Transniester itself blocked off the border in retaliation)

But as Vladimir Socor of the Eurasia Daily Monitor explains, this is not a victory, this is the Ukrainian government backing off. (Kuchma backed off in a single week the last time the topic came up, the YuGov seems to have lasted three) The reason the embargo has been lifted is that Ukraine has opened up some loopholes both in the legal wording of the new customs regime, and by allowing certain goods to simply bypass the Moldovan authorities who should be reviewing all trade.

One would have assumed that shutting down the border was partially political maneuvering ahead of March, but the retrenchment seems to make whatever message was to come out of this rather pointless. Perhaps it was just an attempt to score points in the international community in order to get some good press without needing the guts to actually follow it up with due dilligence.

How sad.

much better than 2004 

It seems to me to be time to check up on the status of the campaign. And it is my great fortune to be able to report things are progressing fairly and transparently so far.

It's a bit dated, but on March 6 the OSCE released its second interim report on the election campaign. For the most part, the news is good.

1. There's been significant media coverage with no consistent bias (UT-1 gives lots of attention to the government but was mostly neutral, Inter spent a disproportionate amount of time trumping for NeTak! over NSNU, and 1+1 gave advantage to NSNU over RoU, Donetsk TRK Ukrayina did what you would expect)
   
2.  Accusations of use of administrative resources have been few and minor (the OSCE caught Socialists candidates a couple of times themselves, and heard accusations on a number of sides in Odesa)
3. Only a couple of minor violent incidents reported
4. some allegations of pressure but no positive IDs yet

Voting Commission Problems

Not all the news is good news, of course. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine, a non-profit election monitoring organization, is concerned about local election commissions. They beleive the commissions are understaffed and overworked, and this may lead to election day controversies. Their concerns are more strongly worded but agree basically with concerns in the OSCE report. An exerpt:

Frequent changes in personnel and frequent replacements in DEC managerial positions continue to hamper the work of some DECs. This directly impacts on the quality and consistency of their work. As of 24 February, 436 DEC’s members had resigned, more than 10% of all DECs’ membership. The rate of withdrawal from managerial positions for the 225 DECs was even higher, affecting 48 chairman, 36 deputy chairman and 60 secretary posts. Reasons given for withdrawal include the responsibility vested in managerial positions, newly-introduced individual liability, the high workload with tight deadlines, and low salary.

I would like to mention, though, that this problem is not a new one. It is very similar to one in the 2004 election. As then, adequate representation is often hard to come by, especially from the minor parties with <1% popularity. It would of course have been better if the CEC were on top of its game here, but with over 7500 deputy candidates in 45 parties competing, this was perhaps inevitable.

Yanukovych's Hedge

Over at Foreign Notes they have been laughing at Yanukovych for claiming there will be massive fraud on election day. Seems pretty idiotic, they say, to discredit the results of an election you are predicted to win.

But to me it makes sense. In all likelihood, Regions of Ukraine will will the largest number of seats. But the exactly margin of their majority is questionable both because different polls give different numbers, and because the polls themselves in Ukraine are not entirely reliable. So what he will do after the election is compare the actual results to the most favorable polls he can find from March, and then make as big a noise as possible about fraud. His hope will be that he can win a couple more seats in court. Furthermore, if you are the first to call fraud, it gives a edge to you when the election happens and you yourself are accused of fraud. You get to call the other guy the copycat.

So a fairly intelligent strategy. Credit to Yanukovych, Akhmetov, their American consultants, or whomever came up with this. Personally, I'm happy he hasn't got anything to complain about right now. That's a big improvement on last year's campaign.

Unrelated Language Comment 

I just wanted to note that commenter Taras has posted a great defense of Ukrainian language policy under my last entry. (also a well-supported discussion of Yushchenko's NBU governorship). A highlight:

In fact, learning Ukrainian never implied unlearning Russian. When Ukraine became independent, the Ukrainians did not retaliate by stigmatizing the Russians culturally. Had they done so, the Russians would have either walked away en masse or crammed themselves with Ukrainian. If all-out Ukrainization happens to be the case, then why do they have just a couple of Ukrainian schools in the entire Crimea and in Donetsk?

With much more besides. 

A Potential Yushchenko-Yanukovych Alliance

Kyiv post is now advocating an NSNU-Regions of Ukraine coalition. While they elsewhere present the case that such a coalition is likely, they go beyond this to say:

...If [NSNU deputies] form a coalition with Yanukovych, not only will they have a solid 300 seats in parliament, which is equivalent to a constitutional vote, they would also represent the interests of a majority of voters across all of Ukraine.

Yes, they have differing views and interests on many issues, but reaching peaceful compromise between competing political forces with different views for the sake of its citizens is what democracy is all about.

Uniting, in the opinion of the KP, is worth it because then they can "pass badly needed reforms within the next several election-free years". In case you missed their point, their outside opinion, from a former US Congressman, says the same thing.

The Conflict-of-Interest Coalition

Have the editors of Kyiv Post completely lost their minds? I've been disappointed by many of their limp opinions in the last few months since losing some staff, but I didn't expect to see this delusional opinion.

The only thing that unites NSNU and Regions are shadow economy business dealings that are grossly against the interests of ordinary Ukrainians. NSNU is for WTO entry, RoU is against, and dragging Ukraine behind. Meanwhile Russia struggles forward as fast as possible to get into the reduced sanctions area and win itself the opportunity, as veto-wielding member, to get concessions from Ukraine later.

NSNU is for NATO, or so they say, while RoU is aggressively against. I've spoken briefly about this before. If NSNU were strongly for the alliance, they would have organized the public information drive they promised. They did not, and now they are merely getting their rewards for mouthing slogans they weren't prepared to back up with action. In any case, if they at least would like some efforts to be made in the direction of NATO, then they're opposed to RoU on this issue, too.

RoU continues its dismissals of the EU, as when Akhmetov said "if we come to Europe today and knock at the door, will they open? I think they won't." Of course they won't, you idiot, Ukraine's judiciary is completely incapable of serving justice, there is a huge shadow economy, transparency is still low, and there are many other things the government should be correcting anyway which will need to be dealt with before serious talk of EU membership. But those would get in the way of your business interests, Mr. Akhmetov, so perhaps that's why you're not so keen.

NSNU pushed through the reprivatization of Krivoryzhstal despite Akhmetov's partial ownership. Does anyone think there will be any more privatization of woefully undercapitalized and decaying industry once Akhmetov himself is calling the shots?

And Reforming Away the Power of Law

As Taras Kuzio, among others, has repeatedly said, one of the greatest failings of the Yushchenko government is that it reneged on its promise "Bandits to Jail!" in favor of the informal "Bandits to Parliament." In an article on Ukraine's NATO aspirations in Ukrainska Pravda, Kuzio wonders what would motivate NSNU to join in coalition with Regions of Ukraine:

Eastern-southern Ukrainians would not give Yushchenko credit for doing a deal with their Regions party. This would lead to Yushchenko not being re-elected for a second term in 2009.

Does Our Ukraine not remember the drop in its support after it signed a strategically futile memorandum with Regions of Ukraine in late September 2005, a memorandum that Yushchenko himself discarded in January?

It is significant that the last moment of unity between the two forces produced a document providing immunity from prosecution to even minor deputies. I would argue that it was an even more major turning point against NSNU than the firing of the Cabinet a month earlier, not to mention a travesty of injustice.

This is what can be expected from any NSNU-RoU alliance.

If Pragmatism Is the Goal, Let Alliances Be Pragmatic Ones

It should not be so hard for the editors of the Kyiv Post to realize that complete stagnation is better than a union that will only be able to agree on regressive measures. Assuming that current poll figures are reflected in the results at the end of March, there will probably be times when NSNU and RoU have to work together on small, obvious issues. So enter in to temporary alliances on only those issues and try to snipe away RoU deputies and other parties to get the necessary majorities on more major issues.

As for who will be PM, this is also obvious. NSNU should, but may be unlikely to, get back with Tymoshenko in the hopes of being able to put together a big enough coalition (with some other allies) to win the PM spot. If they do not get enough seats for this, then what is going to happen is they will, essentially, go back to being the opposition in Parliament. Sad as that is, it is at least truer to the stated goals of NSNU than an alliance with RoU.

Less than a month until elections, how about some debates?

Here I am agreeing with Yanukovych again. The pro-Yanu ForUm people quotes Yanukovych as "dreaming of holding TV debates with Yushchenko," and also hoping to debate with Yekhanurov.

Of course we part ways when he says that he would only like to debate with those two and none else. Watching him spar with Tymoshenko in a debate would be an opportunity I'd truly cherish. But hey, I'd love to see him debate with Yekhanurov, too. Give the man what he wants!(but let Ty come)

If a debate does happen, expect more pointless discussion of making Russian a second national language. I'm with Tymoshenko, if this issue was important to Yanukovych, you might have expected him to do something, anything, about it during his two years as Prime Minister. He didn't because it's both divisive and relatively unimportant - a bad thing to talk about while in power, but a great subject for pre-election rhetoric. Meanwhile the rest of the world, including Russia, is learning ESL.

NATO is also likely to come up, because so many Ukrainians are opposed and the anti-Oranges have been on a signature drive against it. Would have been nice if the Yushchenko government had ever done that public awareness/public support drive they have been meaning to do for so long. Now all they can do is whine about provocations.

Strong Division

Tymoshenko has repeatedly stated that there is no way she would join in coalition with Regions of Ukraine after the election. This, of course, earns her the freedom to try to guilt NSNU into staying away as well. She adds to it accusations that NSNU is conducting secret negotiations to form exactly that coalition with Regions.

While Tymoshenko is certainly agitating for rapproachment after the election, she doesn't want to join her bloc with theirs before the election. The Pora people are wasting their time protesting in front of Tymoshenko HQ, because of this reluctance to join in a united "Orange" bloc. Well of course she's reluctant.

This is a no-brainer on her side: NSNU raises voter suspicion for, among other things, ties to big businessmen like Petro Poroshenko (nothing on Regions of Ukraine, of course, but then, who's counting?). Her bloc is mistrusted primarily for a different reason: not really having a sober economic agenda, as well as some of the accusations back in September that she was trying to reprivatize assets to Privat Bank because she had ties to it. If BYT and NSNU combined they would be more likely to pool voter suspicion than admiration - leading to fewer votes overall. On top of that Tymoshenko would have less control over her own chunk of the total, and less personal visibility (oddly enough, Interfax places her as having the highest voter confidence of any Ukrainian politician. Perhaps she's getting a good response to her public relations campaign?). Since she's obviously going to make the 3% barrier, there's no compelling reason to join with Yushchenko at all.

The only folks who would really have benefitted would have been, not surprisingly, Pora, because right now they are getting only around 1% support on polls, which would not be enough to get them into the Rada. Which begs this question: why are they whining about attaching themselves to blocs when they could be spending their time trying to raise their support base to the 3% minimum for getting seats?

A Word To Pora: Take those activists off Tymoshenko's doorstep and do something useful with them, for goodness sake. They'd be more effective campaigners for you if they were doing practically anything else, including cleaning litter of the street.

As a side note, Pora is technically now in the Klitchko bloc. Again a group defined by ideology drifts into a group defined only by a single charismatic personality. Much as I like Klitchko, this is sad.

Media

Yushchenko has called for denationalization of the media, which is good. Last year at the height of OR optimism, some important figures were calling for the opposite: more state media in the form of a new public broadcasting TV station. In this country, state-controlled media is an easy tool for producing biased news (as the run up to November 2004 proved); much better to use funds elsewhere.

Gas Gab

Zerkalo Nedeli is still hammering away at the gas deal, Ukrainska Pravda is balancing it with a horrifically translated but interesting article on gas and oil theft.

Yekhanurov, by contrast, said last week that Ukraine and Turkmenistan had solved their gas dispute, a claim echoed by RFE-RL using info from ITAR-TASS. What was discussed and decided doesn't seem solid enough to ensure anything like long-term price stability, but it will last through the election, after which it will be the new Parliament's problem.

Well, Crap 

It seems I forgot to spit over my shoulder three times against bad luck after I wrote this:

There's a major bright spot in this lack of non-gassified news, though. What we aren't hearing about are accusations of media crackdowns and use of administrative resources that came up so often in the last election... All the folks who took part in the ORev protests can take heart: whatever problems there have been in Ukraine since January 2006, their efforts won them not only one fair election, but if things continue on like this, a second one as well.

And now I have noticed irksome examples of both. Foreign Notes brought my attention to a newspaper office burning in L'viv and a journalist beating in Donetsk (there was another firebombing claim last fall from a Ukrainian tabloid, not terribly well sorted out). Also Regions of Ukriane broke into a school to get one of their deputies un-fired.

And for the administrative resource, I have political commentary from one of my favorite sources, my mother-in-law: 

…Today the president of our academy came to visit us at the institute and campaign for BYT (Block of Yulia Tymoshenko). Our academy president wants to keep his seat for more than one term, that's why he decided to go into politics and chose support to support this bloc. He seems pretty sure that Tymoshenko will be the new Prime Minister.

So they go around all the institutions belonging to our system and "persuade" people to become BYT party members. Well, people here got used to this kind of requests from higher echelons, that's why they spend all their efforts to ensure the president's support by making their subordinates enter BYT. (e.g. one girl is working on her thesis and she was afraid that if she didn't become a BYT it would reflect badly on her chances. "It's a lucky thing the ballot is still secret" she told mom.)

The election campaign is getting heated up. Tymoshenko has chosen a tactic – sidle up to the electorate: a minimum of the external advertising, very few billboards (it's true), no TV advertising, not a word of advertising on Radio Era either. Instead, you get roundtables to help ordinary people to solve some problems, like "have your been granted the right pension?", etc. They also help orphanages, schools, kindergartens and individual pensioners. So they're at least somewhat useful.

The Regions guys, on the other hand, have been trying to give everybody the shakes: they blather on in sepulchral voices that "Alles Kaput": the economy, social status and international status. And when the proffessor comes, everything will be go back to the good old days...

Man I hope they put together a functioning judiciary sometime soon, so some of these problems can actually get dealt with. A little more refugee friendliness would be nice, too.

Other Bits 

In good news: Ukraine's finally gotten market economy status from the US. 

In entertainment news: Vera Serduchka (as always). Serduchka is officially backing the Green Party. I'm sure the similarity of their political views is obvious.

OK I Admit It

Not a terribly insightful entry today. As penance, here are a few Donetsk pictures. 

Waiting on March 26

There aren't many new proposals out there, what with the March election coming up and no politician wanting to get involved in anything. So it looks like the continuing rumble of the gas crisis is again the focus of attention. However, to be perfectly honest I've run out of gas-related entry titles that don't explicitly refer to flatulence, so I think going to stick with this more subdued title.

There's a major bright spot in this lack of non-gassified news, though. What we aren't hearing about are accusations of media crackdowns and use of administrative resources that came up so often in the last election. This is true even from Regions of Ukraine. All I could find was a tiny bit of whining about decal removal from Pora which is directed at Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko not the Yushchenko government, and the usual rubbish from Ne Tak.

This is a phenomenal improvement on 2004. All the folks who took part in the ORev protests can take heart: whatever problems there have been in Ukraine since January 2006, their efforts won them not only one fair election, but if things continue on like this, a second one as well. 

Can we try that whole "gas agreement" thing one more time?

So now, according to Yekhanurov, the Ukrainian government is “willing to change the gas intermediary if Russia wants to,” picking up on recent Putin comments about RosUkrEnergo not being totally transparent. Ukrainian Radio went ahead and said they were already in negotiations, despite the fact that Yekhanurov hadn't even sent a letter to Fradkov about the idea yet. Nice optimism.

Along with Yekhanurov's wishful thinking, Yushchenko is backpedaling on his support for the gas agreement with Russia, but trying to spin it as merely a natural continuation of his commitment to transparency. His change of heart is by no means too early. Finance Minister Pynzenyk says that at the current price, 2006 budget targets are only barely reachable. Fuel and Energy Minister Plachkov admits that unknown Ukrainian businesspeople own stakes in RosUkrEnergo.

Worst of all, according to the Eurasia Daily Report, the additional shadowy intermediary, UkrGasEnergo, between gas and Ukrainian consumers is likely meant to help provide Russia with a wedge for prying Ukrainian transportation assets away from the nation. The price of gas is deeply volatile, and dependent on a Turkmenistan which has stated its interest in raising prices, but at the current price pegs Naftogaz is primed to quickly fall deep into debt, at which time Ukrainian ownership of its own transportation infrastructure will be funneled through the two layers of intermediaries to Russia.

Kommersant thinks the price pegs will hurt Russia, because the country won't be able to pass along the price hikes from Turkmenistan, but their reasoning seems doubtful, since it relies on the effectiveness of price controls and seems at variance with everything else I'm reading. (Execrable formatting in the article, at least if you’re using Firefox, so if you want to read it, I suggest cutting and pasting to a word file)

The G8 ministers (aside from Russia) took one look at this mess and said: give us market mechanisms and diversified supply.

Half-Empty and Half-Full Economists  

Economic reports don't get much more diametrically opposed than this: 

Anatoliy Halchynskiy rips in to the Yushchenko government's long-term economic strategy in this article in Zerkalo Nedeli. To him, the basic problems are that the Yushchenko government did not use its phenomenal early popularity to push through necessary reforms, and has now "forgotten what the word means". Furthermore, since reforms haven't provided the cash, the massive social spending increases of last spring are now unsupported.

On the other end, SigmaBleyzer begins its January 2006 report, which assesses much of 2005, with the words, "Despite early concerns about Ukraine's economic situation in 2005, the country ended the year with a relatively good performance overall."

They point out that while budget expenditures went way up in 2005, the elimination of a number of privileges and exemptions allowed the government to collect enough new tax revenues to pay for the spending, subsidized by the massive addition of Kryvorizhstal privatization money. (whether or not more of that money should have been put into capital improvement, like desperately needed reductions in energy consumption by major industry, is not covered). They say that if the $95 figure holds through the next year or so, (a big if, as we know), then Ukraine will be challenged, and lose perhaps 2% GDP growth, but this is acceptable and much better than some of the scare figures that came up at the end of December.

Not as bad as it could have been, is their final estimation.

One last little bit of privatization news thrown in here: Parliament imposed a moratorium on the sale of Nikopol Ferro-alloy Plant, for the same old "strategic importance" reasons that held up the sale of Krivoryzhstal.

Sharpening Teeth for the Campaign

Yushchenko gave his annual address to the Rada. Zerkalo Nedeli responded with little enthusiasm. A primary example:

The major emphasis in the presidential speech was laid on the constitutional reform. In fact the constitutional reform was referred to as a main state concern. Everyone who is aware of the nature of Yushchenko’s claims to the political reform can draw the following conclusion: the fight for restitution of authority will be his priority for this year. Such a fight, as a rule, leaves too little time and strength for the implementation of the other tasks [many of which ZN enumerates in the article].

And while Yushchenko was giving his speech, his party was accusing Tymoshenko of carrying out smear campaign. They were also accusing Regions of Ukraine deputies of having no political platform, and, by the way, of being traitors. (the latter accusation is a commentary on their behavior in the gas, milk, and meat disputes with Russia)

Yanukovych came back blaming Yushchenko and his party for Ukraine’s economic woes.

As for the neighbors, Yushchenko again gave lip service to the importance of relations with Russia. Yanukovych said the same thing, but also talked about continuing to work on the Action Plan signed with the EU. The latter positioning beats his stance in 2004, when Yanukovych was notoriously quiet about EU entry in fall 2004.

In contrast, Security Council Chief Anatoliy Kinakh said that since market relations seems to be the order of the day with Russia now, maybe that means Ukraine should get market rate rents from Russia for the Black Sea fleet. After all, Russia unilaterally scrapped a gas deal good through 2009 based on market principles, why not scrap the Black Sea Fleet agreement, good through 2017, on those same principles?

It's a gas, gas, gas

Zerkalo Nedeli has recently translated their analysis of the gas agreement based on information released January 31. The fact that this info was only released on Jan 31 is indicative of the counterproductive secrecy involved in this whole affair. Roman Kupchinsky, formerly head of RFE/RL Ukraine condemns the agreement in a Kyiv Post opinion article here, and does so specifically because of the associated secrecy. The AP basic summary of the reformulated agreement as of Feb 2 is rather more optimistic; and Abdymok also has a more measured take on the agreement and repeats a good (oft-repeated) quote from Yekhanurov “people can curse me for signing the deal this summer, but some may remember me with a kind word when they go home to their apartments tomorrow.”

But ZN is frothing. Basically it talks about how an additional three documents were part of the January 4 agreement. They were sufficiently poor to offend almost the entire Cabinet of Ministers (the one that's being kicked out, the one that's majority NSNU deputies, Yushchenko's own party):

In fact, Minister Plachkov was the only Cabinet member who felt good about the gas agreements with Russia. Some ministers kept silent, but the majority was most censorious. Amongst the latter were [Minister of Economy] Arseniy Yatseniuk, Viktor Pynzenyk, [Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs] Volodymyr Ohryzko and Anton Buteyko, [Minister of Defence] Anatolioy Gritsenko, [Minister for Emergency Situations] Viktor Baloha, [Minister of Construction] Pavlo Kachur, [Minister of Transport] Viktor Bondar, Pavlo Ihnatenko and… [PM] Yuriy Yekhanurov... Presumably, the Prime Minister learned about it a bit earlier than the other Cabinet members, but long after the capitulation had been signed.

And what was ZN's own analysis? (paraphrased)

1) Ukraine has leased its underground storage facilities to RUE at a trifling $2.25 per 1,000 cubic meters for a term of 25 years. [compared to $14 and $17 for European-owned gas]

2) Whereas the minimal European transit tariff is $2.5 per 1,000 cu m, Ukraine will charge RUE and Gazprom a mere $1.6 for pumping natural gas through its pipeline (and this tariff has been set for 25 years!)

3) The national company Naftogaz... loses the right to supply natural gas to industrial consumers, starting next year  - to the communal sector... It loses the right to independently manage the underground storage and distribution of natural gas, or to control the accounts of regional gas distribution companies...

4) ...If one day RUE decides to break the contract on supplies of natural gas to Ukraine, there will be no one left holding the bag.

5) Naftogaz finds itself in a bind. Being cash-strapped, it will be simply unable to properly maintain the national gas transportation system, repay credits, and even pay regular deductions to the central budget. The company’s solvency and financial stability will be reduced considerably. Subsequently, the absence of new credits will stall modernization projects.

6) When supplies of Turkmen natural gas are terminated in 2007, Ukrainian communal consumers will have to pay at least $95 to the joint venture (and not $39 as currently).

7) The joint venture becomes a strong factor of property repartition in Ukraine. In the first place, this concerns the chemical, cement, and metallurgical industries. This instrument may also be used in “regulating” the political situation in this country.

They thought it was rather ironic that Mr Kostusiev, Chair of the Antimonopoly Committee, took a leave of absence for his campaign as a deputy for Regions of Ukraine (with the motto “God and Russia are with us!”) then came back and ruled that the new joint venture was not a monopolist.

Which, if accurate, pretty much overwhelms my old evaluation that it was a compromise in a tight spot later found to have had some additional negative clauses not released to the public. That's a lot more than a simple compromise.

Poll Numbers and Politics

Just some news roundup stuff. 

Razumkov poll numbers from last week:

29.9% Party of Regions
19.6% NSNU
13.7% Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko
6.8% Communists
6.7% Socialists
3.3% Lytvyn's Pop Bloc
2% Vitrenko Bloc
1.5% SDPU(u) and the Ne Tak-ers
1.1% Pora

On the political front, Tymoshenko seems to be at least acknowledging that the 2006 vote will be critical, and that her bloc and NSNU will need to unite with each other, if they don't want to do so with Yanukovych. She's also created a political documentary on herself as a samurai, which may be a less optimistic self assessment than Zinchenko's assertion that NSNU will form a majority in the new government.

And speaking about leaving reality... NSNU and BYUT rapproachement is unlikely if Bessmirtniy can stop it, judging by an Ukrainska Pravda interview (rus) in which he likens Tymoshenko to a Facist:

Question to Roman Bessmirtniy:
Dear Roman Petrovich: How would you describe your relationship with Victor Yuschenko? Why do you dislike Timoshenko so much and why does she strongly dislike you too? And, in general, who dislikes who the most?

Answer:
My relationship with Yuschenko is stable.
As for Tymoshenko: love in politics is out of the question. There exist political interests. Our interests do not coincide. I've never supported advocates of ideologies that verge on radical trends. Solidarism, proclaimed by Yuliya Vladimirovna, was the foundational element of Fascist ideology in its time.

Way to drag the discussion into the toilet, Roman. I'm sure it will help promote constructive dialog and necessary rapproachment in the future. Or would you prefer linking with Yanukovych, the man you think you organized an OR coup d'etat against?

Gongadze Case Dragging Along (Way in the Background)

It's sad that the gas deal is such a huge problem that it's distracting from the case against the killers of Gongadze. (which has been explicitly set up not to implicate any organizers, but just get the thugs who carried out the order). The Kyiv Post is going against the flow in this, but that's not necessarily a great thing. They have a news article on the delays in the trial, but on the other hand, they don't have any news on the gas deal, aside from an outside editorial opinion from Kupchinsky.

Meanwhile, Yushchenko is expressing indignation about the fact that the whole case is going on in secrecy. It rings rather hollow considering the secrecy of the gas deal, and the impotence of those protestations. How about shaking up the PGO instead of just trying to look indignant?

because it's mud-slinging month

Well, February has begun and Foreign Notes has an accusation passed along from Svoboda that RosUkrEnergo transferred $53mn to a company partially owned by Yushchenko's brother just before the gas deal on January 4. Then another accusation, this time against Tymoshenko.

More, but also more moderate accusations from Tymoshenko come through RIA Novosti. Again she faults the Yushchenko government for an disadvantageous gas deal and says it was motivated by politics, not economics. Then different accusations from her that Yushchenko had struck a deal not to prosecute Kuchma.

In order not to make Yanukovych feel left out, Lutsenko reminded the ICTV audience on Sunday that the court ruling overturning one of his criminal convictions from the 70s was forged. 

Unaccountable Speakers

I expect the accusations to get more shrill throughout this month, especially from the smaller parties. To start with, there are plenty of legitimate reasons to find fault with the behavior of the Yushchenko government these past few months. Who knows what went into the January agreement? Very few people, since one of the problems with it was that it was negotiated in secrecy. There will also be Yushchenko's call for a referendum on constitutional reform, which he should not be able to find support for with his low popularity and thankfully so. But while he continues to talk about calling for a referendum, expect more sharp criticism.

What concerns me much more than the grounded criticism about the referendum or the gas deal are the accusations like those highlighted by Foreign Notes - ones which are currently impossible to prove. These gobs of grime are remarkably easy to hurl around Ukraine, primarily because the country's judiciary is non-functioning and untrustworthy. As I said in perhaps my favorite entry of 2005: 

Regardless of whether or not the [Yekhanurov] Cabinet can enact real reform and Yushchenko can win back voters, if the judiciary remains unable to see a case through to completion, progress in Ukraine is going to be extremely slow. In lieu of progress, there will simply be more accusations, because accusations are free, and accusers will not need to worry about being called to account.

Campaigning politicians, when they get down to the last leg of a campaign, seem to always end up resorting to crude negative advertising. The problems with this is that it almost always means dragging down discussion from critical issues to side issues politicians think they will be able to score points on. Furthermore, without a court able to investigate the wilder accusations from politicians and decide on their validity in a manner Ukrainian citizens find trustworthy, there is almost no reason for politicians to temper their criticism. Why bother when the more strongly-worded version will sway more people and no one will hold you account?

All in all, I am so loathe to watch the icky media spectacle I expect that I'd almost rather read about the Satanic Odesan Vampire Woman. 

Lesya and I have been wondering about the Pora political party going into the next election. Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, Yanukovych and most of the other established political parties have political records that can be used to judge what policy they will push for in the future. But, as political newbies, the Pora Party is much less predictable.

[Before I go on, a quick sideline explanation: the Pora party participating in the election is Yellow Pora, which appeared on the scene around the time of the Orange Revolution and was not affiliated with the original (Black) Pora. The Black Pora folks have decided to stay out of politics, in order to maintain their NGO distance.]

Now the Kyiv Post has been helpful enough to furnished the answers to our question: What is the Pora Party about? In a KP interview, Yellow Pora Leader Vladyslav Kaskiv said:

A: We are not caught up with populism. The philosophy of our work is to promote liberal values, such as freedom. We have a plan of actions that we will follow once we get into the parliament. Our primary goal is to cancel the imperative mandate in the parliament [a new rule instituted by constitutional reforms that took effect this year, requiring deputies to vote in line with their faction, or risk losing their seat]. This is 21st century slavery, which leads to a totalitarian regime equally as excessive as [former] presidential rule.

And went on to enumerate the following Pora positions:

1. get the Constitutional Court up and working
2. strip regional deputies of immunity from prosecution
3. reform the system of government so it is transparent and responsive to NGO/private sector initiatives
4. improve transparency further by computerizing government processes
   
5. introduce more stringent government hiring processes
6. reform the judiciary (and blames the PGO for the failure to "put the bandits in jail")
7. push for the orange political factions to reunite
   

and my favorite quote:

Q: Do you support the gas agreement struck earlier this year with Russia?

A: I am not impressed by this agreement. I think that the intermediary role of Rosukrenergo is not the best thing for Ukraine. On the other hand, I personally do not know of anyone who could propose a better solution. But there probably was a better solution. What I know for sure is that it was wrong and irresponsible to use this situation to oust the government.

 After all that, I must say that they seem to be leading with their weak hand. Why do they identify their primary goal as allowing deputies to vote against faction when they're chosing from among such worthy goals as fighting judicial corruption, stripping deputies of immunity, and trying to introduce greater transparency in government?

Of course they have more freedom in the promises they make, since they've never been in power and therefore have no record to defend. Still, their important and relevant choices can't help but contrast well with Yanukovych, who has again made elevating Russian to the status of a national language the main plank in his platform (like I knew he would). This while he tries ever so hard to fault the deal with Russia for not being in Ukraine's interest without faulting Russia. It certainly hasn't dented his popularity yet (hovering at 30% according to some recent polls), but we'll see how he does in February.

As a final clarification, for those who are interested, Kaskiv said that Klitchko will be campaigning for both Kyiv Mayor and Pora deputy simultaneously. No mention was made about which position he would prefer if he won both.

As a few posters have pointed out (Anthony, LEvko, and Leopolis: thanks guys), the emergency gas deal that ended the crisis last week includes more complications than I had originally posted about.

Some clarity was brought to the debate on January 5, when Tymoshenko leaked the agreement to the public (or possibly her version of it). I have the text in English here, from Ukrainska Pravda and translated by the Ukraine List. You might also take a look at this breakdown of the numbers from SigmaBleyzer that I just got from the Action Ukraine List.

I'll let y'all go take a look at it for yourselves and when you're done, you can come on back if you're still interested in discussion.

 ...

Back again? Ok.

The issues raised by this document which I wasn't aware of as of the last entry:

1. Agreement Seems to Only Hold True Through June: As near as I can tell, this agreement, and the $95 price, seem to be in force for six months after the signing on January 4. That means that, come June, both sides will need to renegotiate. It also mentions that the transit cost of $1.60 is theoretically good through 2011, though Ukraine is certain to make raising that rate part of any new agreement.
2. Ukraine Legally Locked Out of Direct Negotiations With Other Suppliers: This seems to be the main point of contention for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, as espoused in this new article, and their related item on the view from Kazakhstan. 
3. The Deal May Involve Some Barter After All: Another recent EDM article discusses how the transition to cash payment espoused in the new deal may not be complete. I said in the last entry that cash transactions beat barter transactions because they are more transparent. If the new deal will, indeed, include some barter, that's a setback.

Still a Good Deal?

Well certainly with three new problems or potential problems, the deal isn't as nice as it looked to me last week. But I will repeat that Ukraine has been getting Russian gas at a discount and letting its industry become painfully inefficient. Countries hardly ever use favorable trade arrangements to prepare for the future, and Ukraine didn't either, its infrastructure remains inefficient. No matter what agreement went down, it would be uncomfortable and painful. A price of $95 through June is bearable pain. I just hope the politicians make headway on solving the efficiency problem after the inevitable downtime in the run-up to this election.

Tymoshenko (joined by Yanukovych) Spearheads Vote to Sack The Cabinet

So Tymoshenko and her party, with assistance from Yanukovych and the Regions of Ukraine crew, pushed through a measure calling for the Cabinet to be sacked, austensibly due to a failure to protect national interests in the gas deal.

Should we be surprised they proposed this? No, of course not. Tymoshenko called for the government to be sacked if no agreement was reached by January, and it was a foregone conclusion she would consider any reasonable agreement an impeachable offense.

Does the action carry any weight? As of January 1, Yushchenko no longer has the legal ability to choose the Cabinet, but Parliament won't get it themselves until March. So they're doin' the limbo until then.

Theoretically the Cabinet should be able to muddle on until March, but that's not guaranteed.

This is just a quick riff in response to Ukrainska Pravda's article: First Cracks in the Armor of the Kremlin's Spin Doctors.

The article is a commentary on Ukraine's recent decision not to invite the CIS observation mission to observe the March election. UP thinks this is a good move, since the CIS observers deserve to be barred for their partisanship during the 2004 election. (the only one they have ever judged negatively, including elections in Belarus and the 'Stans)

I think this is really dumb. Yes, no legitimate observer group would come away from the 2004 Belarus election claiming it was "free and fair". So what? Let them come and give their inevitable speeches about election fraud on the part of everyone but Regions of Ukraine and maybe the Communists. The observers themselves are unlikely to add to the fraud themselves, and the inevitable contrast between their opinion and that of all the legitimate observers will only provide yet another example showing that they produce results to fit an agenda, not in response to the actual event.

By this point, nobody who does not already subscribe to the anti-democratic CIS agenda gives them any credit. What possible harm could they do as observers that is worse than the moral victory they get by being unable to observe? As observers, they will be judged based on their results. As potential observers barred from the process, they can make, and will make, a slew of accusations of corruption and anti-democratic behavior that they need not support with evidence gathered in the field.

Barring the CIS observers doesn't stop them from saying what they've always said, it just stops them from needing to find supporting evidence. 

I make the case that it won't ultimately help Yanukovych 

The gas conflict with Russia continues to broil on. Now the winter break is here and, as the situation stands, Ukrainians could be looking forward to having their gas cut off this New Year's. Which would be a very bad sign to all those out there who believe the old Ukrainian superstition that the way you begin a year is the way the whole year will progress.

Tymoshenko has weighed in now to say that, in the likely event that the government does not reach an agreement with Russia by January 1, the Cabinet should resign. This is some pretty mean-spirited political positioning ahead of the March election, and I am disappointed to see Tymoshenko using it (as Zerkalo Nedeli was before me). I seem to recall her playing a major role in fomenting a gas conflict in July. Then she was the populist PM working for Ukrainian voters by trying to impose price caps on evil Russian businesses trying to charge Ukraine "unfair" prices. Yushchenko had to come in then and rebuked her for her obviously economically-unsound policy. He then put the prices back at market levels and the problem went away.

Now that she's in the opposition, though, it is not the Russian government's but the Ukrainian government's fault that prices are going up. For shame!

Grinding On

Zerkalo Nedeli recently came out with a great analysis of this situation, translated into English (including a criticism of Tymoshenko). I like how they dish out the blame to all participants.

To Russia:

It is naive to think that Russia’s move is aimed exclusively at patching the hole in its coffers. Vice Prime Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov said, “In my opinion, sometimes we don’t formulate our policy in relation to different CIS countries clearly enough. And we act too irresolutely when it comes to our economic influence on those countries’ attitudes to Russia.” According to ZN’s information, Lavrov promised at a closed-door session of the Duma to employ “all available means of economic pressure” on the “disobedient” neighbors. Natural gas and oil, which the Kremlin justly views on par with nuclear arms, is supposed to be the main diplomatic means.

To Yushchenko:

Now, where is Yushchenko’s party Our Ukraine? Why is it still silent? Are the national democratic forces following their leader’s advice “not to politicize the negotiating process?” That is a very good screen for certain “friends” of his, who make money on shady deals with Russian businessmen. The gas deadlock is also another opportunity for them to “drown” Tymoshenko. The impending doom does not seem to worry them much.

To Tymoshenko:

Roman Bezsmertniy, campaign chief of staff for Yushchenko’s election bloc, says that Tymoshenko’s demand to sack the government unless it signs a contract with Russian natural gas suppliers by January 1 is a stab in the back. He is absolutely right and his patriotic statement demonstrates very clearly which Tymoshenko is more concerned about: her problems with Russian prosecutors or her country’s national security.

To Yanukovych: 

The Party of Regions demonstrates utter near-sightedness. Supposing Ukraine fails in the negotiations and the price for Russian natural gas goes up fivefold. This defeat may be fatal for Yushchenko: the critical mass of his errors will drag his team to the bottom in the parliamentary race. Subsequently, Yanukovych and Akhmetov will win, securing a majority in the future parliament, which entitles them to form a government. But the economic impact from the gas price rise will crush their government in a mere six months. Besides, the Party of Regions represents the interests of big financial-industrial groups and its electorate is concentrated in the heavily industrialized regions of the country, which will suffer from these price hikes more than others. In view of such prospects, it would be logical to help the government stand its ground in negotiations with Russia. It is in their interests to secure the terms of the new gas supply contract, under which their chemical and metallurgical plants would profit. But do they move a finger? No. Obsessed by their mania for power, they are ready to victimize thousands of people employed at their factories, not to mention the entire country.

Blame dished out to all, and fairly, I might add.

Guessing About the Public Opinion Response

I haven't gotten any really good public opinion numbers yet. I'm very curious to see whether or not the strong-arm tactics by Russia will work. Will Ukrainians respond more sympathetically to the Russia government's argument (that this is a purely economic move, and that the Ukrainian government is being obstructionist) or to the Ukrainian government's argument (that the Russian government has hiked the price unreasonably quickly, and this is part of an attempt to damage Ukrainian politicians it doesn't like ahead of the Ukrainian election).

ZN seems to think Ukrainians might side with the Russian government, or they would not have worded their condemnation of Yanukovych in that way. Even so, I'm going to go out on a limb and predict that pro-Russian candidates (Regions of Ukraine and the Communists) will do less well with the oil crisis than they would have done without.

Of course they're still going to have a good showing, even in the rerun in 2004 Yanu got 40%, but this escalation of antagonism won't help. Please hold me to this prediction, I will try to make reference to it after the election is over.

Why do I think this confilct will turn Ukrainian opinion against Russia? Four reasons:

1. When was the last time threats of dire economic reprisals from Russia began circulating? During the Orange Revolution. It didn't work then.
2. Yushchenko's popularity, and that of his party, has fallen precipitously since the last election, but if there's one thing that revives the popularity of a politician, it's a threat from outside. I just can't believe that, should Russian Gazprom flick the switch on the nation in the middle of New Year's celebrations, Ukrainians will ultimately feel sympathetic to Gazprom's reasoning.
3. Tied in with the last point, I think the rising antagonism from Russian citizens towards Ukraine (they very clearly see this problem as Ukraine's doing) will not help gain Ukrainian support. It will be easier for Ukrainian citizens to feel confrontational and antagonistic if they think Russians are behaving similarly, and this budding antagonism will partly displace their frustration with their own government.
   
4. Tymoshenko got herself a little ratings boost with her blatantly anti-market attempts to fix low oil prices in July. Ukrainians, as with voters in much of the world, are not particularly altruistic about supporting solid free-market economic policy that hurts their interests (for the most part, the price hike proposed by Gazprom would bring prices charged to Ukraine up even with those charged to Western Europe, not single Ukraine out for unusually high prices).

Ultimately, above any of the previous items, I think Ukraine will respond negatively to Russia as a result of this crisis because the Russian government has underestimated the strength of national identity in Ukraine. I am especially confirmed in this belief because many commentators have underestimate Ukrainian national ideantity, and I am one of them. I underestimated Ukraine just before the Orange Revolution. I came back from observing the election with the OSCE with my wife, and we both thought that the nation would just muddle along. Instead, Ukrainians showed us an amazing amount of dedication to their nation and democratic principles. I'd never heard such nationalism under Kuchma, just like I'd never heard the national anthem sung with such enthusiasm.

That is why I expect that the strength of Ukrainian affiliation to national identity will prompt them to take the side of their own government (despite their misgivings) rather than take the side of a foreign nation against their own.

So the major players going into the March 2006 elections have pretty much solidified, at least as solid as they ever get.

Parliamentary groups are gathered into blocs as well as parties, but the leading parties are currently:

Yanukovych's Regions of Ukraine, Tymoshenko's Fatherland, Yushchenko's Popular Union Our Ukraine (PUOU), the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and maybe Lytvyn's People's Party and Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party.

Smaller Fry

There are a lot of less-than-3% parties and groupings out there, too, including Kinakh's "Whatever He's Calling it This Week" Party, the old Kuchmaite SDPU(u) whose decline I never miss a chance to chortle about, and Pora.

According to EDM, Reform and Order (RaO, an old Yushchenko ally) has decided to break away and join Pora, ostensibly because of the big business contamination in PUOU. This seems in contrast to the picture in this Ukrainska Pravda article, which has the Reform and Order people in with PUOU still. I'm not quite sure what the deal is, yet.

If indeed RaO and Pora split off, I would be inclined to dismiss them as unlikely to break the 3%, except that EDM thinks they're going to headline Vitaliy Klitchko. As a Californian, I'm partial to muscular politicians, and I would caution people not to underestimate the drawing power of a, erhem, heavy-hitter regardless of his lack of political credentials.

No Real Voter Connection

I would like to insert a word of caution that calculating how Ukrainians will vote in March is problematic. In addition to the weakness of polling data, political determinations are made more difficult by the lack of connection between politicians and voters.

The vast majority of voters don't think any party does a good job of representing them, and therefore 93% are not a member of any party. It is thus understandable that they are unenthusiastic when they learn this will be the first election in which all votes will go to parties, rather than a mix of parties and individual politicians. From a democratic institutions standpoint, this should eventually help parties start to emerge with real ideologies, but in the meantime voters are upset with their choices.

Part of the longstanding divide between politicians and voters is the persistent unwillingness of politicians to do anything to address leading voter concerns. Zerkalo Nedeli, in which I found the above figures, does a great job of describing the likely divide we will see between what politicians will be talking about, and what matters to voters:

What Troubles Us

Today most Ukrainians are concerned about such problems as poverty, unemployment, and corruption.

Next in importance are problems related to economic environments: the separation of business and authority and protection of domestic producers (more than 20% of respondents pointed to them as the most pressing).

External problems like accession to the EU, NATO, the WTO, and the CEA [Common Economic Area with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan] appear to be important to fewer Ukrainians (between 2% and 6% of respondents).

Only 5% of respondents are most of all concerned about Ukraine’s transformation into a federative republic, the introduction of a double Russian-Ukrainian citizenship, the nation’s split on religious grounds, and the threat of regional separatism.

What Troubles Parties

These problems, however, are unlikely to dominate the canvassing campaigns of political parties. At best, they might serve as convenient pretexts for criticizing one another. It is already understood that the one who just gives more promises is not a sure winner. On the other hand, competition among strategies and programs will hardly pay: firstly, strategies and programs are written for specialists, and they’re not postcards; secondly, it takes costly intellectual resources to develop them.

Under such circumstances, political parties are inclined to focus on the most “flammable” problems, even if they are not so pressing for the country. The word “party” literally means “part, portion, share, division”. And each of these parts wants to stand out with something distinguishable. The easiest way is to use the available division lines that run between opposite views on external, religious, or language issues. For example, very few West-Ukrainians are concerned about the problem of joining the union of Russia and Belarus, but the majority of East-Ukrainians regard it as vital. Besides, the electoral preferences in those parts of the country are expressed very clearly. There could not be a better recipe for an election campaign. Another example is the Social Democrats’ initiative to call a national referendum on joining NATO and the CEA. Even the initiators themselves cannot predict the outcome of this project, but it is sure to aggravate tensions in the country...

Avoiding the big issues has been a Ukrainian political strategy since independence. It is the reason why, every time a vote rolls around, all of a sudden the Russia-leaning politicians start talking about making Russian a second official language. Language does matter to a significant number of Ukrainians, but regardless of the results of previous elections this issue promptly disappears afterwards.

Why? Because it's not very important relative to corruption, poverty, unemployment, or rule of law (mentioned as a top voter concern elsewhere in the ZN article). Ukrainians would happily just muddle along on language, even NATO and the Single Economic Space, if the country cracked down on corruption, cleaned up the courts, and provided more economic opportunities. Unfortunately, longstanding ties between businessmen and politicians have ensured that many of those politicians have no interest in the kind of changes that would be meaningful to voters.

Voting Anti-Oligarch

Of course the prominence of the Regions of Ukraine party a year after its leader was caught stealing an election is what has made the news the most. And in a move guaranteed to make reasonable decisionmaking easier for Ukrainian voters, Yanukovych has now added Rinat Akhmetov as one of his top ten Regions of Ukraine members going into this election. Also on the list are: twelve managers of companies united in Akhmetov's corporation, Capital System Management, four candidates associated with the Shakhtar Donetsk soccer club owned by Akhmetov, Yanukovych's son, his lawyer, and his press secretary. (from Lavelle article quoted below)

As I've said before, PUOU tends to shoot itself in the foot. One way it has done this is by failing to oust Poroshenko (and a few other big businesspeople) from the party list despite the fact that he is a huge political liability. Guilty, not guilty, voters hate him. It is a testament to the backwardness of Ukraine's "freedom from prosecution for deputies" law that guys like him and Akhmetov still want to run for office despite the effect their presence has on their own party's popularity, and despite being hated by the people they will be swearing to serve.

So Yushchenko's and Yanukovych's supporters are both compromised. Tymoshenko is a bit better off, but she is hampered by her own shady past under Lazarenko. Peter Lavelle's theory is that with all the big political groups compromised, Regions of Ukraine has been able to establish a strong position using a "they're just as bad" argument:

It is ironic that Yanukovych has probably understood Ukraine's electorate much better than his Orange rivals. His message is quite clear -- Remember me? Of course you do. I haven't changed and remember how the economy grew when I was prime minister? During Tymoshenko's time in office, Ukraine's GDP growth dropped to 4 percent after being 12 percent under my watch.

He can easily claim that he isn't any worse than his opponents when it comes to business as usual. Yanukovych has the added advantage of asking the question -- Who are Yushchenko and Tymoshenko? Are they the people you thought they were a year ago?

Yanukovych is angling that the electorate will do the political math and will conclude that he may have not been right a year ago, but in the present he is.

This may very well be Yanukovych's argument, but if so it isn't working. As evidence see Zerkalo Nedeli's poll in the row listing political preference in the 2004 election. Of the Regions of Ukraine supporters, only 2% voted for Yushchenko in 2004. Yanukovych may be trying to win over Yushchenko voters, but the only people he's really won over are other party supporters who voted for him in last year's election (40% did).

But of course he hasn't. No Orange supporters would vote for the Bandit King no matter how fed up with Yushchenko and Tymoshenko they become. If Yanukovych were a wiley politician, he'd angle to steal votes from other parties of the foolish, the Communists and the last of the SDPU(u), as well as poach from Kinakh and Lytvyn.

What should be easy for the Orange crew is making the argument that Party of the Regions politicians are much worse than any of them, even when Poroshenko is included. Yanukovych is now frontlining Akhmetov's entire executive force. If Yanukovych voters are at all reasonable, this should motivate them to vote for someone else. I spent four years in Ukraine without hearing a good thing about Akhmetov. The only other person I could say that about was Kuchma.

So calling all Donbas voters! I've listened to you curse Ukraine's political system for letting Akhmetov steal from you. I've heard everyone in the nation curse the "oligarchs" who control them. Well here is your country's richest man, the biggest oligarch there is. Are you seriously going to vote for him?

I've heard some of you say the only difference is that Yushchenko's party is the party of millionaires, and Yanukovych's party is the party of billionaires. Well, even if that is true, your decision is still not difficult. It's more unpleasant, but it's still not difficult. Do you want to go crawling back to the men who stole the most from you and your families, or do you at least have enough pride and dignity left to fight against the oligarchs by voting for lesser evils?

Or you could vote for Pora. They're a disorganized youth party with no major oligarch presence among very few non-oligarch parties. And I hear they're lead by a political heavyweight.

Officially today has been declared "Freedom Day" by Yushchenko, to celebrate the beginning of the Orange Revolution. On November 21, 2004, the second round of the Ukrainian election was held, and on November 22, when it became clear than Yanukovych and pals had stolen it, people started taking to the streets.

The Orange Revolution was certainly successful in that the fraudulent result was overturned, and in the rerun the guy who should have won Round 2 finally got his win.

However, a number of my Ukrainian friends have been depressed recently about Yushchenko firing Tymoshenko, the "Memorandum of Understanding" with Yanukovych, the rising cost of everything (having to do with Ukraine's current economic difficulties), and the recent poll figures suggesting that Regions of Ukraine might get enough votes to put Yanukovych in as newly-empowered Prime Minister in March 2006. "What did we (and a third of the nation) have the Orange Revolution for?" they ask.

This is what.

Things to Celebrate on Orange Day

1. Democratic Choice: As I will say a million times if I have to - throughout the Orange Revolution, precedent was more important than President. The results on November 22 were very straightforward, Yushchenko had won more of the votes, and the results had been falsified. There had been numerous violations of election law on polling day against Yushchenko, during a process even more suspect than the October vote. Ukrainians had been cheated.
   
   Maybe Yanukovych and the Party of Regions will win big in March. He did get 44% of the electoral vote in round three of the presidential election, so somebody was voting for him. But if his party does win in March, it will be based on votes, not administrative influence. In contrast, the SDPU(o) is hated by the people; it won't be able to win anyway.
   
   This doesn't mean that Ukrainians will necessarily have pleasant choices to make when elections roll around, but they can trust that they live in a democracy, and the results will reflect their vote. If Yanukovych had won based on fraud, then their democratic powers would have been strongly curtailed.
   
   
2. Actual Freedom of Speech: There are no more temnyky. You hear again and again, but I want to remind us what it was like before all these changes.
   
   According to the OSCE: in the period they covered, about 43% of news was covered in such a similar manner across numerous sources that they believed those sources could only have been given the same guidelines to follow. This was verified by reporters standing up on Independence Square to renounce the temnyky guidelines they had been following. All major media sources were pro-government, with the exception of Channel 5, which had been shut down, or threatened with being shut down, three times over the course of the year. When they were shut down in October, the month of the first round of the election, they went on hunger strike to protest and gain enough attention to get put back on. They only made it back on the air just before the election.
   
   My favorite fact from the OSCE, though, is its breakdown of the coverage on UT1, Ukraine's public television station, the equivalent of PBS or the BBC. That station gave 64% of its political and election prime time coverage to Yanukovych, and portrayed him positively or neutral 99% of the time. Yushchenko got 21% of its time, and 46% positive or neutral coverage. Some regional sources were even worse, with Zaporizhzhya state TV giving Yanu 100% of its coverage, and 100% either positive or neutral.
   
   Now you have news stations that hate Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, ones that love them, and ones that are more measured in their attitudes; there are stations all over the map.
   
   
3. Reduced Corruption: The Tymoshenko and Yushchenko people have slung accusations of corruption against one another, and invoked the Orange Revolution in the process. The government still can't carry out a high-profile court case in a respectable manner. And Poroshenko isn't out yet, despite voter opinion. The situation is still loads better than in 2004.
   
   The rules and regulations governing entrepreneurial ventures have been drastically simplified. Tax dodging has shrunk considerably. The corrupt traffic police are gone. And when voters protested against poor regional officials, those officials generally didn't keep their jobs. Even Poroshenko has been demoted in the NSNU party (thanks for the link, LEvko!). He may not be out, but he's down.
   
   Modest progress? Of course, very modest. But compare: Under Kuchma in 1998, Lazarenko was Prime Minister despite being the most hated man in the nation. He stole millions from the economy using his position during the negotiation of oil deals with Russia to do it. How has Poroshenko thusfar been able to use his position for personal advantage? Possibly something, but nobody really knows, and he's out of the government.
   
   Kuchma gave away Krivoryzhstal to his son-in-law. The windfall money from the resale may not all go to voters, but it will certainly be better for the nation than the original sale. Kuchma was a president who based his government in corruption. Yanukovych was his successor, and gave no indication he would change that behavior until he lost the election. Now the way he's trying to get back into politics is by claiming he will fight the corruption in the current administration.
   
   Corruption is on the agenda in a way in never was under Kuchma, and would not have been without the Orange Revolution.

These three items have lead to another benefit Ukrainians will get from the Orange Revolution.

A Parliamentary Election Based on Parties and Platforms

In 1994 there were dozens of possible parties to choose from, most of which appeared just before the election. In 1998, same problem, in 2002, same problem. Just before each election, a new group of deputies would come up with a new name for themselves and go to voters, who would have no idea what their underlying ideology would be. Were they liberal? conservative? free-market? state-control?

No one would be able to tell a thing about them, except, perhaps, for the sadly short-lived "Beer Lovers' Party". But in this Parliamentary election Ukrainians can count on access to a wider range of media sources, providing better information on candidates, with parties competing for their votes whose voting record they can see. And when they vote, they can be much more sure that it will be their votes that determine the winners.

That's worth celebrating.

For my part in the celebration, here's that old Yanukovych Egg Incident video. (6mb avi)

[Taras Kuzio has a list of accomplishments in the Eurasia Daily Monitor (problem areas coming tomorrow). I referenced his when making mine.]